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FREE SPEECH AND PUBLIC HEALTH:
A POPULATION-BASED APPROACH
TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Wendy E. Parmet*
Jason A. Smith"
I. INTRODUCTION
It is banal, but true, to say that we live in an information age.
Today, more than ever, information and the speech that conveys it
are critical currencies as well as sources of wealth and influence.
They help to shape the social, cultural, and political environment in
which we live. They also serve as health determinants.
The role of speech in determining health is especially salient in
the case of childhood obesity. In multiple complex and subtle ways,
speech influences individual behavior, cultural norms, public poli-
cies, and social relationships, all of which form part of the environ-
ment that affects children's weight. This creates a challenge for both
public health advocates and the law. The challenge is how to shape
the informational environment, formed by speech, to one that retards
the epidemic without running afoul of the First Amendment and its
strong preference for free speech. That challenge is not simple. In
recent years, the Supreme Court has enhanced and enlarged the
protections given to speech, including so-called commercial speech.'
As a result, it may be more difficult for government today to regulate
speech that affects obesity than it would have been in the past.
Moreover, even if the government can constitutionally regulate
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1. See discussion infra Part V.B.
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speech, public health advocates should pause before they embrace an
overly loose interpretation of the First Amendment. Although
speech may harm public health, it can also serve as a tool for
protecting it.
How then can we reconcile the First Amendment's protection of
speech with safeguarding health in an information age? This Article
examines that question in the context of the obesity epidemic. We
begin in Part II by situating the role and regulation of speech with
respect to public health in an historical context. We argue that
throughout our constitutional history, society's attempt to protect and
preserve public health has led to conflicts with those interests most
highly valued and respected at the time. In the past, this has included
conflicts between public health and rights of property, contract, or
personhood.2 Today, an increasingly prominent form of the conflict
is that between the right of free speech and public health. Under-
standing that the tensions we witness today between speech and
public health have parallels in prior constitutional controversies
sheds light on the nature of today's conflict and is instructive about
its possible reconciliation.
In Part III we turn to a discussion of the role that speech plays in
determining health.3 We begin by examining three different path-
ways by which speech can influence a population's health. In
undertaking this examination, we demonstrate that the most impor-
tant pathways rely upon the interaction and intervention of social,
population-level factors. In other words, while speech can some-
times influence health by motivating individuals to undertake or not
undertake particular behaviors, speech's greatest influence upon
health comes from its interactions with other social forces to influ-
ence the environment in which populations live.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. We prefer the word "information" because it is more comprehensive
and encompassing than "speech." First Amendment cases and commentary,
however, tend to use the term "speech." As a result, a key question under First
Amendment law is whether the activity in question constitutes "speech." See,
e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). However, the Supreme
Court has held that activities that are not speech in the common sense of the
term, such as burning a draft card, may nonetheless constitute speech because
they are undertaken to convey a message or information. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). We use the term "speech" interchangeably
with the term "information."
A POPULATION-BASED APPROACH
In Part IV we discuss the obesity epidemic. We begin by briefly
outlining the scope and nature of the epidemic. Then we turn to the
role that speech, especially commercial speech, has played in
influencing the weight of children. To a large degree, this speech has
impacted public health by influencing the social, cultural, and
political environments affecting children.
Part V introduces relevant First Amendment law. We begin by
reviewing the Supreme Court's commercial speech and compelled
speech cases and suggest that in applying its stated tests, the Court
has at times recognized and at other times overlooked the myriad
social pathways in which speech affects the informational environ-
ment and hence public health.
Part VI argues that were the Court to recognize consistently that
speech acts not only upon individuals, but also upon the social and
political environments in which they exist-that is, if the Court were
to consider the way that speech affects populations-the First
Amendment would not present quite as formidable a barrier to
limited regulations of commercial speech as it now does. Moreover,
if the Court employed a population-based perspective, 4 it would
more carefully efisure that the protection it affords individuals and
corporations from compelled speech does not extend so far as to
seriously threaten public health.
Finally, Part VII concludes that employing a population-based
perspective will help to balance the application of the values of free
speech with the protection of public health. In other words, this
approach will help courts appreciate that in an information age,
rights of free speech, like other Constitutional rights, can and must
coexist with the state's interest in protecting public health.5
4. A population-based perspective is the defining vantage point of the
discipline of public health. See Jo FAIRBANKS & WILLIAM H. WIESE, THE
PUBLIC HEALTH PRIMER 80-81 (1998). For a discussion of what it means to
apply this perspective in legal analysis, see infra text accompanying notes
455-95.
5. In this Article we do not attempt to reconcile our discussion of the First
Amendment with different theoretical and interpretative constructs prevalent in
First Amendment jurisprudence. Instead, we approach the problem from a
perspective outside of traditional First Amendment discourse, a public health
perspective. For a further discussion of what we mean by "public health
perspective", see Wendy E. Parmet, Liberalism, Communitarianism, and
Public Health: Coniments on Lawrence 0. Gostin's Lecture, 55 FLA. L. REV.
1221, 1233-37 (2003).
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II. PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH DETERMINANTS,
AND THE POLICE POWER
Societies have always sought to protect themselves against
epidemics and to safeguard the health of their populations. In the
United States, the critical job of protecting public health is entrusted,
in the first instance, to the states, which since the founding of the
Constitution have used their police power to enact "health laws of
every description. ' 6  Moreover, although the federal government
lacks a general police power, its enumerated powers have long
served to enable it to promote and protect public health.7
Understandably, regulations aimed at protecting public health
generally target what people, at the time, believe is (but often is not)
causally related to the health threat at hand. As a result, the nature
and goals of health regulations vary over time. During the Puritan
era, for example, colonial and local governments mandated prayer
and fasting, believing that the F eople's lapse of piety was responsible
for the epidemics they faced. The colonies, and subsequently the
states, also imposed quarantines and other regulations that seemed
justified by the medical understandings of the era.
9
A century later, when people believed that miasma caused hor-
rific epidemics, states and cities responded by regulating the disposal
of dead animals and waste. 10 After the bacteriological revolution of
the late nineteenth century, states and municipalities used laws to
prevent the spread of germs." 1 For example, New York relied upon
its health regulations to isolate "Typhoid Mary," a carrier of
6. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
7. See Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11: Rethinking Public Health
Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETICs 201, 203-04 (2002). Because the courts
have tended to treat First Amendment claims against the federal government
identically to those against the states, for the purposes of this Article we shall
overlook issues of federalism and treat the interests of the federal government
and the states identically when discussing the tensions between public health
protection and constitutional rights. Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (striking down state law prohibiting flag burning), with United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 1 10 (1990) (striking down federal flag mutilation statute).
8. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 286
(1993).
9. See id. at 287-88.
10. See id. at 290-91.
11. See id. at 292.
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typhoid.
12
In each case, the interventions infringed upon the personal or
business interests of individuals and entities. Not surprisingly, these
conflicts often made their way to court, where judges had to
reconcile the government's efforts to protect public health with the
interests of the individuals affected.
1 3
Over the years, litigation challenging public health regulations
has taken many forms and has implicated numerous legal doctrines.
A full recounting of such legal conflicts is well beyond the scope of
this Article. For present purposes, only a few points require discus-
sion. First, at least since Reconstruction, challenges to public health
regulations have often been framed as constitutional contests, in
which individuals have claimed that a putative public health law
violates a protected constitutional right.' Second, these challenges
have invoked many constitutional rights.'5 While many factors have
influenced which constitutional claim was raised, claims that were
dominant in the legal discourse of a period were especially apt to
appear in public health litigation.
A. Rights Related to Real Property and Contract
Consider, for example, the age of sanitation, the mid-1800s.
During this early industrial period, public health laws focused on the
sanitary conditions of property as governments sought to regulate the
sanitary environment. In order to implement these reforms, gov-
ernments relied upon legal tools, such as nuisance abatement, which
allowed governments to regulate the use of property.1 7 This forced
courts to consider the scope of a landowner's property right in
opposition to a state's claim to protect public health.
18
12. See JUDITH WALZER LEAvrr, TYPHOID MARY: CAPTIVE TO THE
PUBLIC'S HEALTH at xvii-xviii (1996).
13. See, e.g., Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878)
(holding that a corporation charter did not provide exemption from a nuisance
ordinance).
14. See Parmet, supra note 7, at 201-02.
15. See, e.g., Parmet, supra note 8, at 303 n.270.
16. See GEORGE ROSEN, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 214-15 (1955).
17. Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public's Health: The
Foundations, in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 3, 14-15 (Richard A.
Goodman et al. eds., 2003).
18. See Parmet, supra note 7, at 202.
May 2006)
368 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:363
An interesting example of such a dispute is Fertilizing Co. v.
Hyde Park.19 In that case, the state legislature had granted a fifty-
year charter to a fertilizing company. 20 Subsequently, the legislature
delegated to the village of Hyde Park the power to abate nuisances
with a proviso that could not take any action against the fertilizing
company for two years.21 After the period ended, the town sought to
apply its sanitary ordinances against the company and abate the
nuisance the town believed the fertilizing company was causing.
22
The company claimed that the town violated its contract rights.
23
The Supreme Court disagreed, basing its interpretation in part on its
reading of the charter and the legislation granting police powers to
the village.24  The Court read the documents as it did in large
measure due to its belief that real property rights are limited by the
police power and nuisance law.25 In an opinion by Justice Swayne,
the Court stated:
That a nuisance of a flagrant character existed, as found by
the court below, is not controverted. We cannot doubt that
the police power of the State was applicable and adequate to
give an effectual remedy. That power belonged to the
States when the Federal Constitution was adopted. They
did not surrender it, and they all have it now. It extends to
the entire property and business within their local
jurisdiction .... It rests upon the fundamental principle
that every one shall so use his own as not to wrong and
injure another. To regulate and abate nuisances is one of its
ordinary functions.
26
19. 97 U.S. 659 (1878).
20. Id. at 663.
21. Id. at 664-65.
22. Id. at 665.
23. Id. at 666.
24. Id. at 667, 670. The actual constitutional claim the plaintiffs brought
was a breach of the contract clause. Id. at 666. The plaintiffs claimed that the
charter acted as a contract that exempted it from the city's sanitary regulations.
Id. Although the Supreme Court rejected the contracts clause claim, much of
its analysis focused on nuisance law and the police power, and the extent to
which they limited property rights. See id. at 667, 670.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 667.
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The Court went on to note that common law permitted the
destruction of buildings without compensation to stop the spread of
fire.27 Thus, despite the importance of property, the Court viewed
the individual's contract and property rights as bounded by and co-
existing with the states' police power.
28
B. Due Process Rights
During the epidemiological transition underway at the end of the
nineteenth and start of the twentieth centuries, the dramatic epide-
mics of infectious disease that plagued the earlier era declined
drastically. 29 As they did, chronic diseases and occupational health
hazards took on a new salience as major targets of public health
intervention. 30 This led public health advocates to turn their atten-
tion to a different set of interventions, including those that pertained
to the workplace.
3 1
It was during this period that the clash between public health
and individual interests focused on the "rights" of contract, which the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause supposedly protected.32
Lochner v. New York33 is, of course, the most famous example. In
that case, the state of New York limited the number of hours that
bakers could work to sixty hours a week.34 The state argued, and the
27. Id. at 669-70.
28. See id. A classic articulation of this understanding of the relationship
between rights of property and the police power derives from Justice Shaw's
opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851).
29. THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW
PUBLIC HEALTH: AN INTRODUCTION FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 42 (2000).
30. Id. at 251. This does not mean that courts did not continue to face cases
challenging sanitary regulations as a violation of property rights. They did,
and most often, they continued to uphold the constitutionality of such laws.
See, e.g., Cal. Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Works, 199 U.S. 306, 325 (1905)
(holding that the local government had the power to make regulations
necessary for the protection of the public health).
31. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
32. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS 257 (Lawrence 0. Gostin ed., 2002).
This is not to say that other disputes did not continue. For example, during this
period, public health officials focused new attention on the role that individuals
as carriers could play in the spread of epidemics. This clash led to cases, such
as Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), that raised claims of
individual bodily integrity and liberty against the police power.
33. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
34. Id. at 52.
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New York Supreme Court agreed, that the law was designed to
protect the health of workers and the public that ate their bread.35
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, and found that the
public health rationale was pretextual and that the New York law
violated the liberty of workers to contract for a longer workday.
36
Volumes have been written about Lochner. We need not repeat
an extensive discussion of the case here. For present purposes, only
three points warrant emphasis. First, as we already suggested,
Lochner exemplifies how litigation over new forms of public health
protection (such as occupational regulations) focus on the
constitutional doctrines dominant at the time. While Lochner is an
especially famous example of this phenomenon, it is hardly the only
one. For example, during the twentieth century, there were challen-
ges under the due process clause to numerous public health laws that
conflicted with important social and economic interests. 37  While
each case is unique, and while due process law rightly commands
attention for its own particularities, it is also useful to note that due
process claims covered many issues and conflicts similar to those
that arose under different doctrines in an earlier era.
Second, Lochner dramatizes how public health interventions
often conflict with interests that seem especially critical at the time.
This should not be surprising. In order for public health protections
to have a meaningful impact on population health, they must
necessarily target those activities and interests that affect a broad
spectrum of a population and touch the health of many.38 Regu-
lations that affect only a few, or only those activities peripheral to
society, are unlikely to significantly impact health across a popu-
lation.39 Hence, to have a broad impact, public health litigation
necessarily implicates many of the central activities and concerns of
a society.
35. People v. Lochner, 76 N.Y.S. 396, 402 (App. Div. 1902), rev'd, 198
U.S. 45 (1905).
36. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-59.
37. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (challenging the
state's restrictions on the amount of hours female employees could work).
38. See GEOFFREY ROSE, THE STRATEGY OF PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 53-76
(1992).
39. Id. at 73.
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Third, Lochner reveals that despite the high value that different
constitutional claims may command, courts have rarely regarded the
state's interest in protecting public health lightly. Indeed, despite the
outcome in Lochner, the majority of the Court never questioned that
the state could limit liberty of contract to protect public health.40
Rather, the Court clearly accepted that states could reasonably
regulate and limit that right to protect public health.41 The Court,
however, simply did not believe that the legislature enacted the
statute to protect public health.42 Thus, even in the case that most
clearly epitomizes the pre-New Deal Court's laissez-faire jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court accepted that public health protection
could justify limiting highly cherished rights.
C. The Era of Individual Rights
In the middle of the twentieth century, different constitutional
rights became the favored vehicles for challenging public health
regulations. For example, during the Warren Court era, courts gave a
great deal of attention to the protections that the Bill of Rights
afforded to criminal defendants. 43  It was in this climate, when
substantial litigation and attention centered on the Fourth
Amendment, that the Court undertook the question of whether health
or safety inspections required warrants under the Fourth
Amendment.
44
More notably, with the decline of infectious diseases by the mid-
twentieth century, society began to see health as the result of indivi-
dual lifestyle choices and behavior rather than of public or environ-
mental risks.4 5 At the same time, with the advent of the social
40. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 58.
43. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (holding that
the police must inform suspects in custody about their rights to remain silent
and to consult counsel); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)
(holding that indigent criminal defendants have the right to counsel in state
courts); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that evidence
obtained through uriconstitutional search and seizures is inadmissible in state
courts).
44. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 525 (1967).
45. See JAM[ES F. MCKENzIE & ROBERT R. PINGER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
COMMUNITY HEALTH 200 (2d ed. Jones & Bartlett Publishers, Inc. 1997)
(1995).
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revolutions of the 1960s, constitutional jurisprudence began to focus
less on the regulation of industry and more on the regulation of
individual choice. In this atmosphere, the Supreme Court began to
articulate a constitutional right of privacy that included the right of
individuals to control (at least to some degree) reproductive and
health care decisions that concerned their own bodies.46 As a result,
the Court during this period often viewed the battles between health
regulations and individual interests as struggles over individual
autonomy. 47 Yet, even during this period, when courts were espe-
cially solicitous of individual autonomy, attempts by the state to
protect public health prevailed more often than not.48 Claims that the
right to privacy precluded state laws that mandated motorcycle
helmets,4  closed gay bathhouses, 50 or banned physician-assisted
suicide were not successful.5'
Today, of course, we still suffer from the chronic diseases and
accidents of the 1960s, as well as new infectious diseases that we
could not have imagined three decades ago. 2 So, too, we continue
to debate the extent to which the right to privacy limits the states'
ability to protect public health.5 3 But, increasingly, other constitu-
46. The first important case in this line was probably Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This Fourteenth Amendment privacy
jurisprudence is certainly best known, however, in connection with Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although these cases first became prevalent in the
1960s, their antecedents go back to Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905), decided shortly before Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
47. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990);
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
48. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 797 (1997)
(upholding the state's physician assisted-suicide ban because it sought to
preserve human life and also uphold the integrity and ethics of the medical
profession). This begs the question of what is meant by public health, an issue
not taken up here. For a discussion of the meaning of public health, see
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICs, supra note 32, at 1-6.
49. State v. Fetterly, 456 P.2d 996 (Or. 1969); State v. Vaughn, 29 S.W.3d
33 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).
50. City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 562 N.Y.S.2d 642 (App.
Div. 1990).
51. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 797.
52. See TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 29, at 42-43.
53. This discussion has been particularly noticeable in debates about state
regulation of HIV positive pregnant women. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Cooper,
Why Mandatory Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns Must Fail: A
Legal, Historical, and Public Policy Analysis, 3 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 13
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tional doctrines are becoming more prominent, both because they
have come into judicial favor and because they appear to respond to
the regulatory and public health goals of the time. With globalization
and the development of the Internet, public health regulations
increasingly clash with marketplace imperatives as well as with
federalism doctrines.
5 4
Moreover, as we have moved from an industrial, brick and
mortar economy to an information age in which intellectual property,
data, and the ability to persuade have become increasingly important
assets, efforts to protect public health will necessarily target and
clash more frequently with the flow of information. 55 As a result, in
the information age, legal doctrines pertaining to intellectual
property and speech, often implicating the First Amendment, will
inevitably become more central to public health law.5 6 Moreover,
just as courts have in the past had to reconcile interests of property,
contract, and privacy with efforts to protect the health of populations,
they will now have to resolve tensions between free speech and state
efforts to protect citizens from the health threats posed by speech.5
7
This clash will be especially relevant to efforts to protect children
from obesity.
III. THE INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH
Over the last several decades, epidemiologists have realized that
the determinants of population health are usually multifactorial.5 8 In
(1996).
54. See Wendy E. Parmet & Christopher Banthin, Public Health Protection
and the Commerce Clause: Controlling Tobacco in the Internet Age, 35 N.M.
L. REv. 81, 108-12 (2005).
55. See id.
56. The increasing prominence of intellectual property to public health is
evident in the heated debate about the role of patents in preventing access in
the developing world to HIV medication. See, e.g., Amit Gupta, Patent Rights
on Pharmaceutical Products and Affordable Drugs: Can TRIPS Provide a
Solution?, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 127, 128 (2004); Alicia Ely Yamin, Not
Just a Tragedy: Access to Medications as a Right Under International Law, 21
B.U. INT'L L.J. 325, 326-27 (2003).
57. Cass Sunstein has argued that a "New Deal" should be applied to the
First Amendment. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
255, 262 (1992). By that, he suggests that the First Amendment should be
reconciled with other governmental interests just as rights of property and
contract were during the New Deal period. See id. at 263-64.
58. See T. KUE YOUNG, POPULATION HEALTH: CONCEPTS AND METHODS
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the late nineteenth century, during the period of the bacteriological
revolution, scientists searched for, and often found, single, bacterial
"causes" for disease. However, since the middle of the twentieth
century, epidemiologists have appreciated that complex relationships
between individuals, pathogens and toxic substances, or agents, and
the social, cultural, economic and legal environment all play a role in
influencing the incidence of disease within a population.5 9 Thus,
even the incidence of diseases that can be said to be caused by a
single pathogen, such as AIDS (which is caused by the HIV retro-
virus), is actually determined by many factors. In the case of HIV,
multiple social and cultural factors, including a population's access
to and willingness to use condoms, its propensity to share needles, its
ability to screen blood for transfusions, its treatment of women and
gays, and its rate of sexual activity can all significantly affect the
incidence of the disease. 60 These environmental factors offer targets
for public health interventions, including legal interventions.
61
Noninfectious diseases and conditions, such as obesity and the
diseases with which it is associated (especially type II diabetes), are
especially suited to such an analysis. 62 With these diseases there is
no single pathogen; indeed, there is likely no single factor that is
both necessary for and sufficient to explain the disease's prevalence
within a population.63 Instead, there are multiple factors, embedded
within human genetics, physiology, individual behaviors and
choices, and the environment that determine the susceptibility of
various populations to a disease such as obesity. 64 Public health
efforts to reduce the threats of such diseases, therefore, cannot
95-120 (1998).
59. See id. at 95-97. Young quotes Morris as defining the environment for
this purpose as "living conditions, technology, human groups and institutions,
social networks, values and culture." Id. at 95.
60. See Scott Burris, Education to Reduce the Spread of HIV, in AIDS LAW
TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC 82, 82-88 (Scott Burris et al. eds.,
1993) (describing the behaviors that HIV education should focus on in order to
lower the risk of infection).
61. See id. at 92-96 (suggesting that the government could pass laws
requiring HIV education).
62. For an overview of the obesity epidemic and its causes, see infra text
accompanying notes 179-94.
63. Garry Egger & Boyd Swinbum, An Ecological Approach to the Obesity
Pandemic, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 477, 477-80 (1997).
64. Id.
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promise a magic bullet. They must instead seek to alter individual
behavior and the environments in which people operate.
Speech operates both directly upon individuals and indirectly
upon them via their environment. Speech helps to determine what
people know and what information is widely known and/or believed
in the social environments in which individuals exist. As a result,
speech helps to mold the informational environment, which itself
serves as one of the many factors that influence a population's
health.6 5 For conditions such as childhood obesity, for which there
can be no easy fix, and for which environmental causes are
multifactoral, speech must be viewed as a prime target for public
health interventions.
A. Speech Targeting Individual Behaviors
The most obvious and direct way that speech can influence
health is via the behavior or decisions of individuals. This pathway
has drawn significant attention in recent years as epidemiologists
have "recognized that many personal behaviors or lifestyles are
associated with the development of a variety of diseases and health
problems." 66  Speech, public health advocates hope, can inform
individuals about the risks they face and thereby influence them to
change their behavior and make healthier choices. Thus, with
respect to smoking, the lifestyle "choice" most clearly responsible
for increased mortality, early public health efforts, such as the 1964
Surgeon General's report on smoking67 and the Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1965,68 sought to provide individuals with
information about the dangers of smoking. 69 This information, it was
hoped and presumed, would enable individuals to make an informed
choice about the dangers associated with smoking and thereby influ-
65. Kasisomayajula Viswanath & John R. Finnegan, Jr., Reflections on
Community Health, Campaigns: Secular Trends and the Capacity to Effect
Change, in PUBLIC HEALTH COMMUNICATION: EVIDENCE FOR BEHAVIOR
CHANGE 289, 306-09 (Robert C. Hornik ed., 2002).
66. YOUNG, supra note 58, at 110.
67. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SMOKING
AND HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE (1964) (describing the adverse
health effects that can result from smoking).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2000).
69. 1d. § 1331.
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ence people to break the habit. 70 Likewise, with respect to HIV,
public health efforts have centered to a large degree on providing
individuals, both through the media and via individual counseling,
with information about their own HIV status, how they can and
cannot transmit HIV, and how they can reduce their chance of
contracting the disease.7 1 Again it was hoped and presumed that this
information would lead individuals to make safe choices for them-
selves and their sex partners. 72 In this context, in particular, public
health advocates argued for open and uncensored speech, battling
with opponents who objected to the dissemination of sexually
explicit information. 73
Despite the difficulties assessing the evidence,74 little doubt
remains that information influences health by prompting individuals
to assess their situation and alter their behavior. Certainly we can all
recall circumstances in which we have made a decision to engage in
or to cease a dangerous behavior after learning about its risks.
Advertisers also attempt to utilize this direct-to-individual pathway.
For example, the phenomenon of direct-to-consumer marketing of
drugs depends, in part, on this approach. Advertisers tell individuals
that their products are powerful, effective, safe, or even just
desirable, and people go out and seek prescriptions for them.
75
Likewise, one of the rationales for informed consent is that indivi-
duals will make decisions based on information that they receive as
individuals.76  Some studies support that assumption: information
70. See id.
71. See JAMES MONROE SMITH, AIDS AND SOCIETY 126-28 (1996).
72. See Vicki S. Freimuth, Theoretical Foundations of AIDS Media
Campaigns, in AIDS: A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE 91, 106 (Timothy
Edgar et al. eds., 1992).
73. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of the methodological problems pertaining to the
determination of the efficacy of public health campaigns, see Robert C.
Homik, Evaluation Design for Public Health Communication Programs,
Epilogue to PUBLIC HEALTH COMMUNICATION: EVIDENCE FOR BEHAVIOR
CHANGE, supra note 65, at 385, 385-405.
75. This is clearly an over-simplification. Advertising operates on many
levels, many of which are not rational. See infra text accompanying notes
338-76. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that some advertisements do
work to convey information, whether true or false, to individuals.
76. See Ann Bostrom, Vaccine Risk Communication: Lessons from Risk
Perception, Decision Making and Environmental Risk Communication
Research, 8 RISK 173, 180 (1997).
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given by physicians can influence the choices patients make. 77 Of
course, those findings suggest another point about the impact of
individually-targeted information: its strength depends, to a degree,
on the traits which listeners associate with the speaker.78  The
influence, trust, and expertise associated with the speaker will help to
determine the impact of the message on the listener.
79
Although little doubt exists that individuals can make decisions
based upon information that they directly receive, controlled studies
have failed to show significant efficacy of public health campaigns
premised on this pathway. 80 It turns out that the simple act of
conveying information to an individual seldom suffices to change
that individual's behavior.8 1 To change behavior, frequent exposure
is also required.82 In addition, people do not always, or usually,
respond rationally to the information they receive. 83 In most cases,
other pathways or influences are necessary to change behavior.
Behavioral analysts suggest that individuals fail to change their
behaviors and opinions when directly presented with information in
part due to the bounded nature of rationality.84 Individuals do not act
solely in a rational manner, nor do they act in a completely irrational
manner.85 Rather, "individuals are predictably irrational. 86 Human
77. See, e.g., Annette E. Clark, Autonomy and Death, 71 TUL. L. REV. 45,
117-18 (1996).
78. See R. S. DOWNIE ET AL., HEALTH PROMOTION: MODELS AND VALUES
46 (1990).
79. See id. at 112.
80. See Robert C. Hornik, Public Health Communication: Making Sense of
Contradictory Evidence, in PUBLIC HEALTH COMMUNICATION: EVIDENCE FOR
BEHAVIOR CHANGE, supra note 65, at 1, 13.
81. See id. at 12. Homik believes that one reason for this failing is the
methodological flaws of the controlled studies that have been undertaken. See
id. at 16. But he and other researchers also recognize that the pathways for
changing human behavior are complex and that campaigns that simply provide
individuals with information are often poorly suited to induce behavioral
change. See id. at 13.
82. Id. at 13.
83. See Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases,
and Institutions in the First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
84. See id. at 12. Horwitz writes that human rationality is inherently a
"bounded rationality" because humans are limited by finite memories that are
subject to failure and distortion, time constraints, and imperfect information.
Id. As a result, decisions lead to sub-optimal outcomes. See id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 6.
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beings cannot process the vast amount of information presented to
them and often do not have access to perfect information. 7 Instead,
they often take cues from their environment and culture to assist in
their decision making.88  These cues, or heuristics, affect human
behavior.
8 9
The availability heuristic is particularly relevant to the impact of
speech pertaining to health. 90  According to behavior analysts,
individuals tend to consider a possibility as more likely to occur,
depending upon the ease in which it comes to mind.91 Simply, the
more vivid, emotional, extreme, or common speech is about an
event, the more people are apt to think the event is commonplace or
likely to occur, even if there is evidence to the contrary.9u This
availability heuristic highlights the importance of considering the
other pathways by which speech influences health.
A public health campaign targeting Sudden Infant Death
Syndrome (SIDS) illustrates both the possible strengths and limi-
tations of the direct-to-individual approach. Over ten years ago, the
National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the SIDS Alliance, and other
groups launched the "Back to Sleep" (BTS) campaign.93  They
developed this campaign after studies showed that sleeping prone is
associated with an infant's increased risk for SIDS.94  The BTS
campaign mailed brochures and educational materials to physicians,
clinics, and other healthcare providers asking them to discuss sleep
position with pregnant women and new mothers and to urge them to
place their infants on their sides or backs.95 The BTS campaign also
staffed a hotline and produced consumer brochures and public
service announcements urging parents to reduce the risk for SIDS by
87. Id. at 12.
88. Id. at 13.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 14.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 15.
93. See National Institute of Child Health & Human Development, SIDS:
"Back to Sleep" Campaign, http://www.nichd.nih.gov/sids/sids.cfm (last
visited Aug. 22, 2005).
94. Id.
95. See National Institute of Child Health & Human Development, Clinton
Administration Announces Expanded Back to Sleep Campaign, http://www
.nichd.nih.gov/sids/clinton.htm?from=women (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
i
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placing their children in the supine or side position for sleeping.96
Evidence suggests that the campaign was remarkably effective.
Between 1992 and 1999 the incidence of SIDS in the United States
dropped 40% as a result of the BTS campaign's introduction in
1994.97 By providing "just the facts" to individuals, in other words,
by relying upon the rationality of individuals receiving relevant
information, the BTS campaign was able to reduce infant deaths,
showing that direct-to-individuals speech can have an important
effect on behavior.
98
Despite its overall success, the BTS campaign also highlights
some of the limits of public health informational campaigns that seek
to alter behavior simply by giving individuals information. First,
researchers have hypothesized that the BTS campaign achieved the
success it did in part because the information conveyed was
relatively simple to comprehend, the danger the campaign sought to
help people avoid was great (an infant's death), and the behavioral
change suggested was relatively simple and easy to adopt.
99
Additionally, because the greatest danger to infants from SIDS is in
the first six months of life, the required behavioral change did not
have to be put in place for very long. 00 Had the intervention
required long-term attention, the campaign may have been less
effective. Moreover, information that is about more complex
problems or that is more nuanced may also be less apt to change
behavior.' 0' Behaviors that are addictive, habitual, or result from
deeply ingrained social patterns may also be harder to change.
10 2
96. See id.
97. Rachel Y. Moon et al., Back to Sleep: An Educational Intervention with
Women, Infants, and Children Program Clients, 113 PEDIATRICS 542, 542
(2004).
98. Another campaign that may have been similarly successful was one
aimed at getting parents to stop giving their children aspirin when they have
the flu or chicken pox in order to reduce the risk of Reye's Disease. See
Stephen B. Soumerai et al., The Effects of Professional and Media Warnings
About the Association Between Aspirin Use in Children and Reye's Syndrome,
in PUBLIC HEALTH COMMUNICATION: EVIDENCE OF BEHAVIOR CHANGE,
supra note 65, at 265, 266.
99. Id. at 283 (discussing the simplicity of the information and behavior
change at issue in the Reye's campaign).
100. Moon et al., supra note 97, at 545.
101. Soumerai et al., supra note 98, at 283.
102. See id.
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These types of difficulties in changing behavior result in what has
been termed "bounded willpower."' 10 3 Bounded willpower acknowl-
edges the effect that addiction, habit and physiology can have on
decisions and individuals' ability to act. 10 4 Thus, it is far easier for
individuals to hear information about SIDS and change their infant's
sleeping positioni than it is to hear information about HIV and alter
their own sexual behavior.
Despite its strengths, the BTS campaign was not uniformly
successful across populations. For example, deaths from SIDS did
not decrease in minority communities or among mothers who did not
graduate from college. 105 Further studies emphasized the importance
of cultural context and media in sharing information with targeted
communities. 10 6 In other words, the campaign failed to reach some
mothers when it only conveyed factual information to individuals
directly through brochures and pediatricians.0 7 Only after the cam-
paign altered the materials and information it conveyed and targeted
more complex social pathways, did the speech concerning SIDS
begin to impact minority communities and mothers without college
degrees. 10 8 By targeting the information to the correct social net-
works, emphasizing the extreme nature of the event (death of an
infant), and repeating the message, the campaign took advantage of
the availability heuristic to influence behavior.
B. Speech and Culture
Speech influences culture, including social and legal norms.
This may be an obvious and simple statement, but it is one worth
exploring in order to understand how speech influences public
health. Smoking, mentioned briefly above, offers an excellent
example. In the mid-twentieth century, smoking was very prevalent
in the United States. In fact, the majority of adult American men
were smokers.
10 9
103. Horwitz, supra note 83, at 13.
104. Id.
105. Michael J. Corwin et al., Secular Changes in Sleep Position During
Infancy: 1995-1998, 111 PEDIATRICS 52, 57 (2003).
106. See Moon et al., supra note 97, at 546.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. In 1965, 52% of adult men in the United States smoked cigarettes. See
Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in
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Cultural and' social norms, and the public policies they initiated
and reflected, help to explain both the rise and fall of the incidence of
smoking." 10  For many decades, tobacco companies sought to
influence cultural attitudes by taking advantage of the availability
heuristic and the bounded nature of rationality. At the height of its
advertising, the tobacco industry saturated the culture with
commercial speech lauding the supposed benefits of smoking."
I '
The branding images from the period have become iconic: Joe
Camel, the Marlboro Man, and the women of Virginia Slims.
12
Tobacco companies sold lifestyle and image while touting "personal
responsibility" and "personal choice." ' 1 3 This speech made smoking
appear glamorous, cool, and very "in," creating a cultural acceptance
of smoking."14 Studies suggest that this approach was effective. For
example, smoking surged measurably among young women in 1967,
corresponding precisely with the launch of the 1967 Virginia Slims
campaign. 115
On the other hand, speech has also altered the culture in ways
that have led to a decline in smoking. In 1964, Surgeon General
Terry released Smoking and Health.l 16 This report was the first
official report by the federal government showing a causal relation-
ship between cigarettes and lung cancer and chronic bronchitis."1
7
The passage of the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
19651" rapidly followed the report's release. Thereafter, an "anti-
the United States, in REGULATING TOBACCO 11, 11 (Robert L. Rabin &
Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
110. Many scholars have discussed the role that culture plays in influencing
law and public policy, as well as the role that law may play in influencing
culture. See, e.g., LAW IN THE DOMAINS OF CULTURE (Austin Sarat & Thomas
R. Kearns eds., 1998).
111. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 172
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
112. John Slade, Marketing Policies, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note
109, at 72, 77.
113. Id. at 73, 77.
114. Kagan & Nelson, supra note 109, at 11 (noting the prevalence and
glamorization of smoking in motion pictures during the 1940's and 1950's).
115. Slade, supra note 112, at 77.
116. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, supra note 67.
117. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., History of the 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and
Health, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/30yrsgen.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
118. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
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smoking" movement began. 19 It reflected and created new cultural
connotations about smoking as well as new public policies that
reflected and reinforced those negative images.12
The relationship amongst speech, culture, and smoking is
complex and multidirectional. 121 There has been no single, unified,
public health campaign that has led to a major reduction in
smoking.'2 2 But clearly, cultural norms, and hence attitudes and
individual behaviors, have changed. According to a report by Robert
Kagan and William Nelson:
In many ways, the public health-oriented reformers and
lawyers have been remarkably successful [in diffusing
information], [and] bringing about three broad transfor-
mations in public understanding of the nature of the
cigarette problem-first as a product harmful to smokers,
then as one harmful to nonsmokers as well, and finally as a
problem of corporate malfeasance and fraud too. One sign
of their success has been the decline in the social popularity
of smoking. 1?3
In other words, cultural perception changed behavioral norms
and thereby individual decisions. Many individuals who decided to
refrain from smoking did not do so simply because they learned of its
danger. Rather, they decided to abstain or were able to decide to do
so because they lived in a culture in which smoking had ceased to be
what everyone does. 124 The fact that in 1995, only 25% of adults in
the United States smoked, made smoking a less socially typical
behavior, and therefore one that fewer individuals would adopt.
125
119. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (EXECuTIvE SUMMARY) 14 (2004),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/sgr/sgr_2004/pdf/executivesummary.pdf.
120. See id. at 13-14.
121. For some discussion of the changing attitudes about smoking, see id.
122. Rather, over the years, private organizations and public agencies have
responded on numerous occasions to the Advisory Committee's call for
"appropriate remedial action." See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention,
supra note 117.
123. Kagan & Nelson, supra note 109, at 14.
124. The phenomenon of peer pressure and influence is especially powerful
with adolescents. See Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision
Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 229-30 (1995).
125. See Kagan & Nelson, supra note 109, at 11.
A POPULATION-BASED APPROACH
The changing cultural climate also made smoking a behavior that
more individuals and associations could feel free to limit or
condemn. For example, anecdotal work suggests that more public
facilities, work places, and residences are adopting restrictions on
smoking.12 6  In addition, as information led to cultural changes,
legislatures increased tobacco taxes and enacted, in many states and
localities, indoor smoking bans. 127 Both of these legislative strate-
gies altered the environment in which would-be-smokers decided
whether to smoke.128 As a result, smoking rates declined., 29 Hence,
speech affected rates of smoking and health not so much by directly
influencing individual choices but by inciting a process that altered
the cultural and public policy environments.
The Harvard Alcohol Project and its Designated Driver
campaign provide another example of how speech can spark
community dialogue and thereby cultural and political responses to a
problem. In 1988, the Harvard Alcohol Project partnered with major
television networks, writers and advertisers to launch a concerted
campaign to introduce the concept of "designated drivers" in the
United States. 130 Over a year, popular television shows such as L.A.
Law, Mr. Belvedere, and Family Ties incorporated scenes and
dialogue into episodes that showed characters at parties or bars
drinking and introduced the "designated driver" concept. 13 1 The
project coupled these television shows with a large, nationwide infor-
mational campaign on designated driving. 3 2 In 1990, the Harvard
Project was even. able to persuade the first President Bush to record
126. Another example comes from a recent jury verdict in a housing court in
Massachusetts. The jury found smoking in a rented condominium, even one
without a smoking restriction, to be a legal nuisance. Harwood Capital Corp.
v. Carey, No. 05-00187 (Mass. Housing Ct. June 8, 2005).
127. Peter D. Jacobson & Lisa M. Zapawa, Clean Indoor Air Restrictions:
Progress and Promise, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 109, at 207, 215.
128. Taxes were especially effective in arresting smoking among young
people. Frank J. Chaloupka et al., Taxing Tobacco: The Impact of Tobacco
Taxes on Cigarette Smoking and Other Tobacco Use, in REGULATING
TOBACCO, supra note 109, at 39, 54; Jacobson & Zapawa, supra note 127, at
227; Nancy A. Rigotti, Reducing the Supply of Tobacco to Youths, in
REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 109, at 143, 162.
129. See sources cited supra note 128.
130. Randall Rothenberg, TV Industry to Fight Against Drinking and
Driving, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1988, at Al.
131. Id. at A1, D1.
132. Id.
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public service ahnouncements to air during the holidays, urging
party-goers to select designated drivers. 33 This campaign empha-
sized the seriousness of drunk driving, the severity of its conse-
quences, and repeated, throughout the media, the same idea: the
designated driver. 1
34
It worked. Studies showed an association between the Designa-
ted Driver campaign and a decrease in alcohol-related auto deaths
and injuries. 135 In a 1993 survey, 64% of adults in the United States
reported assigning a designated driver when going out drinking.
136
While the campaign was associated with a decrease in deaths and
injuries, it did not achieve its results merely by providing individuals
with relevant information or even by altering the cultural
environment. It also changed public policy. 137  The Designated
Driver campaign, in conjunction with additional media coverage of
drunk driving, focused policymakers on the problem. Since the
campaign began, the number of legislative and regulatory initiatives
introduced to deter drunk driving has increased. 138 These legislative
and regulatory policies have been, in contrast to the Designated
Driver campaign alone, directly associated with and have caused a
decrease in drunk driving. 139 Moreover, scholars have demonstrated
the relationship between media coverage of drunk driving in the
culture and policy formation.' 40 Greater awareness of the problems
associated with alcohol-impaired driving has provided the grounds
for improved regulations, stricter sanctions, and stronger law
enforcement policies that have measurably affected drunk driving.
The campaign powerfully demonstrated the use of information to set
health policy.
133. Randall Rothenberg, Bush to Lead Televised Plea on Sober Driving on
Holidays, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1990, at B20.
134. Id.
135. Itzhak Yanovitsky, Effect of News Coverage on the Prevalence of
Drunk-Driving Behavior: Evidence from a Longitudinal Study, 63 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 342, 349 (2002).
136. William DeJong & Jay A. Winsten, The Use of Designated Drivers by
US College Students: A National Study, 47 J. AM. C. HEALTH 151, 151 (1999).
137. See id.
138. Yanovitsky, supra note 135, at 345.
139. Id. at 349.
140. Id.; see also Toben Nelson et al., Factors Associated with Planned
Avoidance of Alcohol-Impaired Driving in High-Risk Men, 60 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 407, 407 (1999).
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The Designated Driver campaign also demonstrated the some-
times unexpected consequences of altering the informational
environment. While studies are ongoing, it appears that the desig-
nated driver campaign had some unintended and harmful effects.
14 1
Specifically, preliminary data suggested that use of designated
drivers is associated with an increase in binge drinking. 142 Addi-
tionally, among college students and younger drivers, preliminary
data indicates that the campaign may put women at risk for increased
violence. 143  If not properly trained and supported, women who
attempt to intervene with an intoxicated male partner may risk
physical or verbal abuse. 144  As this example reminds us, the
informational environment is complex and multifactorial, and the
relationship between speech and health is not always easy to predict.
C. Information, Trust, and Population Health
So far, we have discussed the role that speech and information
can have on a population's health by influencing individual decisions
and behaviors, the social environment in which individuals make
decisions, and the public response to health threats. There is another,
perhaps more subtle way that speech and information can affect
public health: by promoting or undermining trust, a major component
of the social capital that is critical for effective public health.
In recent years, scholars and theorists have explored the inter-
related concepts of trust and "social capital." According to Francis
Fukuyama, "[t]rust is the expectation that arises within a community
of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly
shared norms... '1 At the individual level, trust may be critical to
establishing an effective therapeutic relationship between patient and
health care provider. 146  At the population level, trust may be
141. See Nelson et al., supra note 140, at 411.
142. DeJong & Winsten, supra note 136, at 155.
143. Nelson et al., supra note 140, at 411.
144. Id.
145. Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional
Theory, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 280, 280 (2002) (quoting FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 26 (1995)).
146. L. Ebony Boulware et al., Race and Trust in the Health Care System,
118 PUB. HEALTH REP. 358, 359 (2003); David Mechanic, The Functions and
Limitations of Trust in the Provision of Medical Care, 23 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 661, 662 (1998).
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essential to the formation and maintenance of social capital, 147 or the
"features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks,
that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated
actions."148
Social epidemiologists have documented that social capital and
trust may be associated with population health. For example, lack of
trust among African Americans with the medical profession and the
public health system, derived from a history of discrimination and
mistreatment, has been implicated in the existence of significant
racial health disparities. 149  Likewise, Kawachi, Kennedy, and
Lochner report that mortality within communities in the United
States is positively associated with lack of trust within those
communities.1 50 They also note a "striking correlation" between
social capital within a state and the reported response of state
residents as to their health status.'51
Numerous hypotheses have been advanced to explain the
correlations between social capital, trust, and public health. For
example, researchers have surmised that a lack of social cohesion
may be biologically stressful on individuals. 152 In other words, as
social animals, humans are stressed by being isolated or living in
disharmonious relationships. Another possibility is that societies
with low amounts of social capital are less apt to invest in or accept
taxation for the public goods that may be critical for public health. 53
147. Macey, supra note 145, at 280.
148. Jason Mazzone, Speech and Reciprocity: A Theory of the First
Amendment, 34 CONN. L. REV. 405, 420 (2002) (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM
ET AL., MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIvic TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY
167 (1994)).
149. Boulware et al., supra note 146, at 363-64.
150. Ichiro Kawachi et al., Long Live Community: Social Capital as Public
Health, in ETHICAL HEALTH CARE 45, 46-47 (Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E.
Parmet eds., 2006).
151. Id. at 46-47.
152. Lisa F. Berkman & Thomas Glass, Social Integration, Social Networks,
Social Support, and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 137, 151 (Lisa F.
Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi eds., 2000).
153. Lisa F. Berkman & Ichiro Kawachi, Social Cohesion, Social Capital,
and Health, in SOCIAL EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 152, at 174, 185-86. In the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, the lack of investment in disaster planning or
prevention (including investment in the levee system) would seem to bear out
the statement that everyone may be at risk due to a lack of social capital. On
the other hand, the Hurricane also reveals the sad but obvious fact that the poor
386
A POPULATION-BASED APPROACH
When individuals feel little connection to others they may be more
inclined to see health issues as individualistic and to resist
investment in public health resources.'5 4  This privatization of
healthcare obviously disadvantages those who are poor and lack the
assets to invest in their own health, but it also may disadvantage
those who are economically well off but find that they have health
problems that individual efforts cannot alone resolve. Consider, for
example, a wealthy person who has a coronary attack in a
community that lacks a good public emergency medical response or
well-supplied emergency room.
A closely related reason why social capital may be positively
associated with public health is that social capital can diminish
collective action problems. 55 In communities in which individuals
are connected to and trust one another, collective action problems
become less costly to solve. 156 Individuals can predict, with greater
assurance, that others will also act in ways that maximize the
community's well being.'5 7 In these circumstances, it makes more
sense for individuals to act in ways conducive to the public good.1
5 8
Public health frequently implicates collective action problems;
indeed, one can understand public health to be at least a partial
public good. 159 The public nature of public health is most obvious
with respect to infectious diseases and the techniques for preventing
or retarding their spread. For example, vaccination confers a public
benefit because it extends protection to the community at large rather
are disparately impacted by a lack of social capital and public investment.
154. Id.
155. Mazzone, supra note 148, at 420.
156. See id. at 427. David Mechanic states that "trust is an essential 'glue'
that holds communities together and allows us to pursue our affairs without
excessive suspicion, policing, and regulation. The erosion of trust, therefore,
damages the effectiveness of medical interventions, and invites legislative and
regulatory micromanagement of health affairs." Mechanic, supra note 146, at
662.
157. See Mazzone, supra note 148, at 421; Mechanic, supra note 146,
at 662.
158. Mazzone, supra note 148, at 421.
159. See David Woodward & Richard D. Smith, Global Public Goods and
Health: Concepts and Issues, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS FOR HEALTH:
HEALTH ECONOMIC AND PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 3, 9 (Richard Smith
et al. eds., 2003). Illingworth notes that trust is also a public good. See
Patricia Illingworth, Bluffing, Puffing and Spinning in Managed-Care
Organizations, in ETHICAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 150, at 271, 278-79.
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than simply to those who are vaccinated. 160  This is because an
individual decision to be vaccinated reduces the chance that the
disease will spread. If enough individuals are vaccinated, a herd
immunity develops which stops the transmission of a disease within
the community. 1 Yet, if vaccination rates within a community are
relatively high, individuals will face a low risk of contracting the
disease at issue, and, if they act as rational individualists, they may
well resist vaccination. 162 By binding individuals to others, making
them care about others within their community and internalize the
community's norms, social capital and trust may make each
individual more willing to seek vaccination, not only for his or her
own good, but also for the common good.
Similar, though less obvious examples may exist with respect to
health problems presented by noninfectious sources. Decisions that
individuals make with respect to driving (for example, whether to
obey a speed limit when there are no police in sight), to smoke in
public, to dispose of hazardous materials safely, or to keep a gun in
their homes can all raise collective action problems. In each case, a
choice that appears to be rational from an atomistic perspective may
entail significant externalities. In societies with sufficient social
capital, individuals may consider those externalities because they
feel connected to others and because they feel confident that others
will so regard their own interests. When the community lacks social
160. See Wendy E. Parmet, Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They
Compatible When it Comes to Vaccines?, 8 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 71,
74 (2005).
161. Id.
162. Id, In these examples, we are employing the assumptions of rationality
used by welfare economics. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW § 1.3 (6th ed. 2003). Our use of rationality should not be seen as
incompatible with our critique of rationality and adoption of behavior analysis
above. See supra text accompanying notes 81-92. The behavior analysis
critique does not contend that rationality never exists, nor that populations
cannot exhibit individually selfish behavior when the social, legal, and
economic incentives are conducive for such behavior. Indeed, the collective
action problems we discuss can be understood as examples of situations in
which individuals, believing they are acting in their own interest, are actually
acting in an irrational manner. Moreover, to the extent that social capital and
trust ameliorates social action problems, they may be understood as helping to
override an atomistic rationality by establishing a heuristic of social trust. In
communities with robust social capital, people trust one another whether or not
they should.
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capital, individuals may decide to ignore the interests of others,
presuming that others will do likewise. In this "each person for
themselves" milieu, individuals may be more apt to endanger the
health and safety of others.
The trust and social capital that nurtures public health depends,
in many ways, upon both the existence and nature of speech. 163 This
is so for several reasons. First, the very act of speech operates as a
sign of respect. By speaking to someone, by providing them with
information, a speaker is signaling his or her respect for the dignity
and agency of the listener. This display of respect and dignity can
help the listener trust the speaker. Of course, as we shall discuss
shortly, deceitful or harmful speech undermines trust.
The literature pertaining to the relationship between physicians
and patients and the role of informed consent has frequently noted
and discussed the relationship between speech and trust. For
example, in Canterbury v. Spence, 164 one of the seminal informed
consent cases, the court characterized the physician's obligation to
provide patients with information about medical procedures as an
obligation arising from the physician's fiduciary or trust relationship
with the patient. 65 To merely act upon a patient, without providing
the patient with information sufficient to make an informed choice,
demonstrates disrespect for and undermines the agency of the patient
and constitutes a breach of trust. Perhaps for this reason, patients are
more apt to trust and follow interventions suggested by physicians
who take the time to explain clinical benefits and risks.
166
Likewise, populations may be more likely to trust and comply
with public health suggestions when information is provided to them
about the need for and reasons behind public health recommen-
dations.' 67 Few people and fewer communities, are willing to accept
163. In turn, trust facilitates speech, as people are more apt to speak with and
reveal more information to those in whom they trust. See Illingworth, supra
note 159, at 278.
164. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
165. Id. at 782.
166. Ronald M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for Participatory
Decision Making, 291 JAMA 2359, 2359 (2004); Parmet, supra note 160, at
82; David H. Thom et al., Measuring Patients' Trust in Physicians When
Assessing Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. 124, 124-26 (2004).
167. Likewise, at the individual level, trust in physicians seems to facilitate
compliance with their orders. Thom et al., supra note 166, at 124.
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"just do it," or "trust me" for long. Thus, studies of Toronto's
experience with the SARS virus highlight the role of public health
information and public health hotlines in promoting compliance with
voluntary quarantines. 168 Had public health officials not given the
population sufficient information to understand the importance of
quarantines, and had social capital been weaker in the area in the first
place, many more people may have been unwilling to accept public
health requests to stay at home. Likewise, people are generally more
willing to follow recommendations and vaccinate their children if
they are given information about the benefits of vaccination.1
69
Speech can also foster trust by allowing individuals to engage
with one another, promoting reciprocity and the development of
common norms. As Ellen Goodman reminds us, "[c]ommunication
is... embedded, lexically and conceptually, in community,
communion, and common."' 170  The social process includes
communication and the sharing of ideas, which are among the ways
in which individuals within democratic societies connect to each
other and develop their cultural and legal norms. Indeed, many
scholars have identified speech as an integral part of the deliberative
process that helps to constitute democracy. 17  Cass Sunstein goes
further and sees this deliberative aspect of speech as an animating
rationale for the First Amendment.' 72 He writes: "The belief that
politics lies at the core of the [First] [A]mendment is an outgrowth of
the more g eneral structural commitment to deliberative
democracy."'
7
People in a democratic state debate and deliberate about policies
affecting public health, in addition to other issues and interests. In
this sense, speech helps to shape the contours of public health policy,
and thereby public health. As a result, the very process of commu-
nicating and exchanging ideas can itself promote cooperative
behavior and trust, 174 which, as we have seen, can affect public
168. Parmet, supra note 160, at 99-100.
169. Id. at 104.
170. Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy out of the Box: Content Abundance,
Attention Scarcity, and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1389, 1405 (2004).
171. See, e.g., infra note 459.
172. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 314.
173. Id.
174. Mazzone, supra note 148, at 429.
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health.'
Of course, to note that speech can influence health by promoting
trust is not to say that it cannot also undermine trust. Some types of
speech, such as hate speech, may destroy both community and
trust.176 In other circumstances, false or manipulative information, as
well as information that reveals falsehoods or trust-depleting
behaviors, may undermine trust. For example, Patricia Illingworth
notes that patients may lose trust with their physicians and managed
care organizations when they learn about the conflicts of interest
inherent in reimbursement mechanisms. 177 Likewise, when the
public comes to learn via the media that yesterday's expert advice
was erroneous, the public may become more skeptical of so-called
health experts. Even more problematic are revelations that health
officials have based health information on concealed or ulterior
motives, such as when the public learns that public health officials
have received financial rewards from pharmaceutical companies.
178
Although such revelations may increase trust in the long run if they
lead to reform and reduce conflicts of interest, in the short run such
revelations may induce cynicism and distrust.
The relationship between speech, information, trust, and public
health is thus complex and multifaceted. To some extent, speech and
information are critical to trust and, hence, the protection of public
health. But they can also serve as the basis for the betrayal of trust
and, hence, the erosion of the public's health. In either case, they
influence population health, a fact that is especially evident when we
focus on the problem of childhood obesity.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 145-69.
176. ld. at451.
177. Illingworth, supra note 159, at 276 (quoting Sheryl G. Stolberg, Now
Prescribing Just "hat the Patient Ordered, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1997, at E3).
178. For example, much has been written about the influence of the
pharmaceutical companies on government drug research and hence the health
advice that is communicated to the public. See, e.g., Denise Grady, Medical
Research Dealings Explored by a Senate Panel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at
A20. As scandals erupt and the public legitimately becomes suspicious about
health information, trust may be threatened. See id.
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IV. INFORMATION AND OBESITY
Overweight and obesity are pressing threats to public health. 7 9
In the past two decades, there has been a steady and striking increase
in the prevalence of overweight and obesity in the United States.'
80
In 1999, 34% of US adults were overweight and 27% were obese.'1
8
The increase in the prevalence of childhood obesity has caused
significant alarm in the public health community:
Over the past three decades since the 1970s, the prevalence
of childhood obesity... has more than doubled for
preschool children aged 2 to 5 years and adolescents aged
12 to 19 years, and it has more than tripled for children
aged 6 to 11 years. Approximately nine million American
children over 6 years of age are already considered obese.1
8 2
Overweight and obesity are associated with myriad diseases and
conditions.18 3 Most troubling among children is the explosive rise in
type 2 diabetes. 8 4 The number of children developing this condition
is staggering. It is estimated that children born in 2000 in the United
States have between a 30% and 40% chance of being diagnosed with
diabetes at some point in their lives if obesity rates level 185 Left
unaddressed, the pediatric obesity epidemic is expected to produce a
population in which amputation, heart disease, stroke, metabolic
179. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define obesity, for
adults, as having a BMI greater than or equal to 30 kg/m. CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY: DEFINING OVERWEIGHT AND OBESITY,
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpa/obesity/defining.htm (last visited Nov. 13
2005). They define overweight, for adults, as having a BMI between 25 kg/m
and 29.99 kg/m2. Id. While overweight and obesity are distinct clinical
conditions, we will refer generally to the "obesity epidemic" by which we
mean to include the epidemics of overweight and obesity unless otherwise
specified.
180. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE SURGEON
GENERAL'S CALL TO ACTION TO PREVENT AND DECREASE OVERWEIGHT AND
OBESITY 10 (2001), http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/obesity/callto
action/CalltoAction.pdf.
181. Id.
182. INST. OF MED. OF, PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY 22 (Jeffrey P.
Koplan et al. eds., 2005) (citations omitted).
183. See id. at 67.
184. See id.
185. Id. at 67-68.
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syndrome, and hypertension will be commonplace among adults.
186
Obesity and overweight are also poised to directly affect life
expectancy in the United States.'
87
The economic and social costs of obesity are difficult to
compute. Socially and psychologically, obesity takes a great toll on
children. Obese adolescents are more prone to emotional and behav-
ioral problems and are more likely to develop psychopathologies in
both adolescence and adulthood.18 8  Also, overweight and obese
children are more likely to be the victims of verbal bullying and
physical aggression. 189  Overweight and obesity in children can
disrupt social development and facilitate the disruption of social
relationships and interactions.19
0
186. ld. at69.
187. See Katherine M. Flegal et al., Excess Deaths Associated with
Underweight, Overweight, and Obesity, 293 JAMA 1861, 1863-65 (2005).
There was some controversy in 2005 when the researchers at CDC reported
that earlier studies estimating deaths related to obesity at approximately
365,000 were probably too high, and that the actual number of excess deaths
associated with obesity was only about 111,000. See id. The new study also
indicated that being overweight may have a slight protective effect. Id. at
1864. Needless to say, the food industry and others promoted the study
suggesting that previous public health warnings were exaggerated and that
overweight might even be "good for you." See, e.g., The Center for Consumer
Freedom, http://www.consumerfreedom.com/newsdetail.cfm/headline/2790
(last visited Nov. 13, 2005). This perspective was not based on a careful
reading of the study. The prevalence of obesity remains unchanged, and
obesity and overweight are serious public health problems. The slight
protective effect described is associated more with the elderly overweight
where underweight.is a serious problem and where slight overweight can be
beneficial. See Flegal, supra at 1864. The study also is unable to account for
the availability of advanced medical technology in the clinical treatment of
overweight and obesity. See, e.g., Bruce M. Wolfe & John M. Morton,
Weighing in on Bariatric Surgery: Procedure Use, Readmission Rates, and
Mortality, 294 JAMA 1960 (2005) (discussing the increased use and popularity
of bypass procedures in the treatment of obesity). The issues around these
studies are complex. The recent symposium at Harvard on these studies
provides an in-depth analysis. See Weighing the Evidence: Symposium on
Overweight, Obesity and Mortality (May 26, 2005), http://www.hsph.harvard.
edu/weighingthe_evidence/.
188. See Serpil Erermis et al., Is Obesity a Risk Factor for Psychopathology
Among Adolescents. , 46 PEDIATRICS INT'L 296, 296, 298, 300 (2004).
189. See id. at 300.
190. Id.
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Analysts expect the economic costs of obesity to be hundreds of
billions of dollars.' 9' The prevalence of obesity drives increased
private health insurance spending. 192 Direct costs associated with
overweight and obesity totaled $75 billion in 2003.193 Increases in
the rate of obesity among children would only increase costs
associated with the condition. 194  Given the seriousness of this
epidemic, it is worth examining all the environmental factors
affecting children, including information.
Speech influences overweight and obesity. The contemporary
environment faces a deluge of speech relating to food, diet, activity,
and body image. Some of this speech comes from the government,
including health agencies. Some of this speech comes from
individuals, family members, and friends. The press and popular
media are also sources of speech. More speech comes from indus-
tries that have a particular economic interest in influencing how
people think about food and their bodies, as well as how they eat. In
the sections below, we survey some of this speech and demonstrate
the different pathways by which it affects the population's risk of
obesity. In so doing, we focus particular attention on the commercial
speech of the food industry. We do so not because it is the only
speech in the informational environment, but because it is both a
critical health determinant and a likely target of government regu-
lation.
A. The Cultural Impact of Food Advertising
As we discussed in Part III, speech can influence health via
multiple pathways. Culture is one important pathway. Speech
191. See INST. OF MED., supra note 182, at 70.
192. See Interview by Larry Levitt, kaisernetwork.org, with Kenneth E.
Thorpe, Emory University, (June 27, 2005), in W5 HEALTH AFF. 317 available
at http://www.kaisemetwork.org/healthcast/uploaded-files/062805ha-thorpe
_transcript.pdf.
193. Allison C. Morrill & Christopher Chinn, The Obesity Epidemic in the
United States, 25 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 353, 357 (2004).
194. We note here that obesity and overweight are not public health
problems merely because of their social costs. Obesity is a public health
problem, as opposed to only a clinical, individual problem, because, as we
discuss below, its causes are social and ecological. The environmental effects
of a growing prevalence of overweight and obesity further exacerbate the
epidemic. The ecological model and obesity as a public health problem are
nicely described in Egger & Swinburn, supra note 63, at 477-80.
A POP ULA TION-BASED APPROACH
influences and becomes part of the culture, influencing people's
actions. 195 Advertisers understand this and use this pathway to create
a culture that persuades people to use their products. As the National
Cancer Institute noted, "[c]ommercial advertisers have learned that a
consistent and prominent presence in the marketplace is key to
achieving and holding market share."'196 This has been particularly
evident with respect to food advertising.
The food industry spends great sums of money on advertising,
much of it aimed at children.197 All types of advertising directed at
children have increased significantly over the past thirty years.' 98 In
1983, analysts estimated that advertising and marketing directed at
children totaled $100 million. 99 Today, it is $15 billion.2 °0 In the
late 1970's, experts estimated that children saw about 20,000
television ads per year.20 1 They saw 30,000 advertisements in the
1980s and 40,000 in the 1990s.
20 2
The majority of advertisements directed at children pertain to
food.20 3 Most of these advertisements promote highly processed
foods that are of poor nutritional quality. 204 In 1997, 47.5% of food
advertising in the United States promoted pre-prepared foods,
195. See supra text accompanying notes 124-34.
196. CAL. PAN-ETHNIC HEALTH NETWORK & CONSUMERS UNION, OUT OF
BALANCE: MARKETING OF SODA, CANDY, SNACKS AND FAST FOODS DROWNS
OUT HEALTHFUL MESSAGES 8 (Sept. 2005) [hereinafter OUT OF BALANCE]
(quoting National Cancer Institute, 5 a Day for Better Health Program
Evaluation Report, http://www.cancercontrol.cancer.gov/5adexec.html),
available at http://www.asu.edu/educ/epsl/CERU/Articles/CERU-0509-140-
OWI.pdf. Advertisers are not the only speakers who seek to influence culture.
The popular press and media certainly do that. See supra text accompanying
notes 130-34.
197. See OUT OF BALANCE, supra note 196, at 1.
198. See JULIET B. SCHOR, BORN TO BUY: THE COMMERCIALIZED CHILD
AND THE NEW CONSUMER CULTURE 21 (2004).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN
CHILDHOOD OBESITY 4 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.kff.org/entmedia/
uploadiThe-Role-Of-Media-in-Childhood-Obesity.pdf.
202. Id.; see also OUT OF BALANCE, supra note 196 (describing network TV
as the most popular advertising media for the food industry in 2004).
203. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., supra note 201, at 5
(explaining that 32% of food advertising is for candy, 31% is for cereal, and
9% is for fast food).
204. Id.
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candies, soft drinks and bottled water.205 Of the remaining 37.3% of
food advertising, only 2.2%, costing $159 million, was spent promo-
ting fruits, vegetables, grains and beans. 20 6 In a study of advertising,
researchers found that if children consumed the foods in children's
advertising, their diets would include a daily intake of sugar
exceeding one cup and very high amounts of fat and salt.2 °7 But do
these advertisements influence children and affect their health?
Modem theories of consumption and culture suggest they do.
Since the industrial revolution, the difference between products in
the same category has become practically nonexistent; for example,
one dishwasher detergent works as well as another.208 This mass
production of goods led to a shift in advertising. Unable to draw
distinctions between goods, marketers began to associate products
with lifestyles.20 9  Ads persuaded consumers to buy a particular
product because of its associations with certain values, attributes,
lifestyles and cultural roles.210 The primary function of advertising
ceased to be transmitting information about a product. Instead,
advertising sought to sell a cultural sensibility.
Several examples illustrate this new approach. Burger King
recently launched its "Coq Roq" Internet campaign.21' The Coq Roq
Web site tells the story of a rebellious singer who starts a band and
refuses to be a "slave to the record industry. 21 2 Where did he find
inspiration? According to the Web site, his inspiration came from
another Burger King Web campaign.21 3  Burger King's previous
205. Anthony E. Gallo, Food Advertising in the United States, in AMERICA'S
EATING HABITS: CHANGES AND CONSEQUENCES 173, 178 (USDA/Econ.
Research Serv. ed., 1999).
206. Id. 15.3% of the advertisements were for alcohol. Id. We are not
suggesting that the industry purposefully intends to increase overweight and
obesity.
207. Kristen Harrison & Amy L. Marske, Nutritional Content of Foods
Advertised During the Television Programs Children Watch Most, 95 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1568, 1572 (2005).
208. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Commu-
nication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 704 (1993).
209. Id.
210. See Daniel Robinson, Marketing Gum, Making Meanings: Wrigley in
North America, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC'Y 4, 21-22 (2004).
211. See Burger King Brands, Inc., Coq Roq Web site,
http://www.coqroq.com (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
212. Id.
213. Id.
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advertising for chicken sandwiches inspired him to found his band.214
The Web site has news, clippings, music videos, and images from
concerts.215 The entire site sells an image, a cultural role. Only by
drilling down into the site does one find a link to Burger King's main
Web site. The entire Coq Roq site is advertising, yet it transmits no
information about the product.216 The purpose of this advertisement
is not to convey information about Burger King chicken sandwiches,
but to associate the product with rebellion, independent music,
grunge bands from the 90's, and sexual and artistic independence.
Purchasing Burger King sandwiches will communicate these ideas to
others.
217
Wrigley gum provides an historic example. When Wrigley
began selling his gum in the early twentieth century, there were
generally negative associations with chewing.218 It was associated
with the lower classes and with those who rode "street cars" and
attended "burlesque house[s]. '2 9 Using advertising and promotional
giveaways, Wrigley was able to turn chewing gum, traditionally a
purely discretionary purchase, into a major industry and an icon of
American advertising. 220 Wrigley associated the gum with health,
vitality and innocence. 221 The Wrigley "Spearman" was an espe-
cially useful marketing tool and was used to target children and
mothers:
The Spearman first appeared in a Mother Goose
promotional booklet that Wrigley issued in 1915. The 16-
page booklet featured the Spearman in various Mother
Goose settings, complete with chewing gum and Wrigley
214. The previous advertising was the "Subservient Chicken" campaign. Id.;
see also Burger King Brands, Inc., Subservient Chicken Web site,
http://www.subservientchicken.com (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).
215. Burger King Brands, Inc., supra note 211.
216. See id.
217. This association of products with cultural roles has been identified as a
"Diderot Unity." See GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION 119
(1988). Simply, the Diderot Unity is the unification of cultural roles with
products. See id. at 119. The theory of Diderot Unities, and by implication the
Diderot Effect, are driving principles of modem commercial speech. See id. at
118.
218. Robinson, supra note 210, at 22.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 5.
221. See id. at39.
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references in the reworked nursery rhymes .... Teachers
requested them for classroom use, a source of considerable
surprise and delight to Wrigley: "if any man would have
told [me] that the time would come when [I] would get
chewing gum advertising into the schools [I] would have
called the man crazy.,
222
To counter negative social associations with chewing gum,
Wrigley targeted retailers with promotions offering cameras, watches
and furniture based on sales. 223 Wrigley specifically chose the items
he offered because they were associated with the middle and upper
classes, and he hoped the associations would change retailer and
customer perceptions of his gum.
224
Both Burger King's and Wrigley's advertisements illustrate the
new character of advertising. The associations of advertising,
marketing, and cultural meaning have serious impacts across
cultures. Our concern, though, is to examine how this new "adver-
tising of meaning" impacts overweight and obesity in children.
This type of advertising affects children's culture and, conse-
quently, their health. While much remains unknown about the causal
relationships between food advertising and the health of children,
several facts are well established:
225
1) studies of food preferences using experimental designs
have consistently shown that children exposed to
advertising will choose advertised food products at
significantly higher rates than children who were not
exposed; 2) findings from food purchase request studies
based on surveys, diaries, experimental trials, and direct
observation of mother-child pairs shopping have consis-
tently shown that children's exposure to food television
222. Id. at 31.
223. Id. at 19.
224. See id. at 21-22.
225. See Mary Story & Simone French, Food Advertising and Marketing
Directed at Children and Adolescents in the US, 1 INT'L J. BEHAV. NUTRTION
& PHYSICAL AcTIVrTY 1, 11 (2004). Although we do not address the issue
here, there are indications that the activity of using media (for example,
watching television or using the computer) does have a direct relationship to
overweight and obesity regardless of the content. Aetna InteliHealth, Being
Overweight or Obese, http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/WSIHW000/
32833/32856/357943.html?d=dmtChildGuide (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
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advertising increases the number of attempts children make
to influence food purchases their parents buy; 3) purchase
requests for specific brands or categories of food products
also reflect product advertising frequencies .... 226
Food marketers understand this, and they understand modem
children, targeting them accordingly. 227 Children spend more money
than ever as consumers, and marketers target their individual
behavior to capture that spending power.228 Children influence adult
purchasing (e.g., "the nag factor"), and marketers target these social
relationships and cultural characteristics. 229 While more research is
required, it is clear that advertising works: "Based on children's
commercial recall and product preferences, it is evident that adver-
tising achieves its intended effects, and an extensive systematic
literature review concludes that food advertisements promote food
purchase requests by children to parents, have an impact on
children's product and brand preferences, and affect consumption
behavior. '
Building brand recognition and preference is also important, as
establishing brand preference is often sufficient to affect consump-
tion behavior.231 As noted above, modem advertising and consump-
tion seeks to sell cultural roles, rather than products, by associating a
product/brand with a particular cultural attribute.232  These
associations are important because of the "Diderot Effect.,
233
Advertising imbues meaning in things and these meanings are
conceptually grouped together. 234  The effect is a "force that
encourages the individual to maintain a cultural consistency in
his/her complement of consumer goods." 235 On the one hand, this
226. Story & French, supra note 225, at 11.
227. Id. at 3. We use the term "target" to describe advertising to children
because it is the advertising industry term for directing a message at a
particular population. See Best Knows, Target Audience, http://en.mimi.hu/
marketingweb/targetaudience.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
228. See SCHOR, supra note 198, at 23.
229. See id. at 23-24.
230. INST. OF MED., supra note 182, at 173 (citations omitted).
231. See SCHOR, supra note 198, at 125-26.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 208-24.
233. McCRACKEN, supra note 217, at 118-19.
234. See id. at 119.
235. Id. at 123.
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works to maintain consistency for the individual.236 On the other
hand, the effect can institute a radical change in behavior in the
individual.237  In what is known as the "departure purchase," an
individual buys a product that is associated with a cultural role that is
inconsistent with'his current possessions.238
For example, I might have a wardrobe that consists of simple
bargain outlet clothes. These possessions suit my needs. Yet, for
some reason, one day I purchase a pair of expensive designer shoes.
My new purchase may have a radical effect on my perception of my
old clothing. Research has shown that, because of my need for a
certain semiotic consistency in my goods, I may soon launch into a
process of consumption, replacing my older bargain clothes for
designer labels that are in harmony with the cultural significations of
Prada.239 Modem advertising, regardless of the audience targeted,
seeks to induce the departure purchase. 240  The importance of the
departure purchase lies in the spiraling quality of the Diderot
effect. 241 If marketers can induce this phenomenon, observers have
noted, it will tend toward continual consumption in a fashion that
spirals up.242  The goals of advertisers and marketers are to
continually re-brand, re-associate, and induce increasing con-
sumption of their products.243 In the sections below, we begin by
offering examples that explore how the food industry targets
commercial speech directly to children to alter both their behavior
and culture to induce consumption.
236. See id. at 124. Apple computer users are a good example of how the
Diderot Effect maintains continuity. The cultural roles associated with Apple
computers have been so strong that they make alteration of the individual's
behavior around computer purchasing difficult to alter. See Leander Kahney,
Apple: It's All About the Brand, WIRED NEWS, Dec. 4, 2002, http://www.
wired.com/news/print/0,1294,56677,00.html. Apple computers have created
extreme loyalty to what the Apple brand "means." See id. Some users have
had Apple logos and icons tattooed onto their bodies. Leander Kahney, Tat's
the Way Mac Heads Like It, WIRED NEWS, Aug. 5, 2002, http://www.wired.
com/news/print/0, 1 294,54202,00.html.
237. See MCCRACKEN, supra note 217, at 125.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 126-29.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 127.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 129.
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B. Advertising Directed to Children in Schools:
Targeting Purchasers via Their Culture
Schools provide important environments for children. In school,
children not only study a prescribed curriculum; they socialize, they
acculturate, they eat, and they become active or inactive. The school
environment, which includes the informational environment within a
school, shapes children socially, intellectually, and physically.
244
Importantly, children face limited options as to how they will interact
with their school's environment. Schools are relatively closed
environments that limit what children can do and how they can
respond to their environment.
Recently, food companies have played an increasing role in
influencing the informational environment within schools, taking
advantage of the opportunity that schools present to influence the
behaviors of the captive population of children.245  For example,
exclusive contracts that place vending machines in schools not only
provide students with beverages that directly influence their health,
they also send students a message about what should be consumed
and the meaning of particular brands.246 In addition, many com-
panies provide scholarships to students to attend college, sponsor
clubs and activities, and integrate themselves into every facet of the
school community. 247 At the end of a child's public schooling, the
244. Susan Harter, Teacher and Classmate Influences on Scholastic
Motivation, Self-esteem, and Level of Voice in Adolescents, in SOCIAL
MOTIVATION: UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S SCHOOL ADJUSTMENT 11, 11
(Jaana Juvonen & Kathryn R. Wentzel eds., 1996).
245. See, e.g., NICOLA PINSON, SCHOOL SODA CONTRACTS: A SAMPLE
REVIEW OF CONTRACTS IN OREGON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS, 2004 (2004).
246. Contracts require that brands and anything with a soda brand on it be
visible at all times, that is, vending machines cannot be covered with posters or
hidden. Id. at 12. The soda companies may also donate scoreboards, soda, and
other materials to the schools, all of which are heavily branded. Id.
Exclusivity combined with the heavy advertising and restrictions essentially
capture the culture of the school in terms of soda vending. See id. at 6-7.
Contract terms provide further incentive for the school district to promote sale
of the soda. Id. at 7-11; see also contracts on file with authors.
247. See, e.g., The Coca-Cola Scholars Foundation, https://www.coca-
colascholars.org/cokeWeb/jsp/scholars/Index.jsp (last visited Nov. 14, 2005);
General Mills Foundation, http://www.generalmills.com/corporate/commit
ment/foundation.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2005); Hormel Foods, 10 Hormel
Foods Charitable Trust Scholarships Awarded (Apr. 21, 2005), http:/
/media.hormel.com/templates/knowledge/knowledge.asp?catitemid=2&id=284
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child will come to associate a particular brand with his or her school
sports teams, after-school activities, yearbook, school dances, and
graduation. The soda brand will be associated with the student's
education, school experience, adolescence, first school dances, and
other key moments in development. Ultimately, the "good old days"
of an individual's youth will be synonymous with "Coke" and
"Pepsi." In addition, the child will carry knowledge of the brand to
adulthood, affecting future choices.
Contracts beiween soda companies and schools are not the only
way that food advertising enters schools. Channel One, which
produces twelve minute "news broadcasts," is piped into 12,000
middle and high schools throughout the country, reaching eight
million students.248 Schools with Channel One contracts are required
to show the twelve minute broadcast in its entirety-which includes
two minutes of commercials. 249 The majority of this advertising on
Channel One is for junk food.z5 ° Studies indicate that Channel One
advertising affects students' brand preferences, and students often
incorporate brands and commercial images into their assignments
and school activities.25' The messages of food companies become
part of the school's fabric and the children's environment.
Of course, food company messages are not the only information
children receive about food and nutrition while at school. Many
schools attempt to provide meals and instruction that comply with
dietary guidelines. 252 While nutritional counseling is important, it
cannot completely counteract industry influence. As Marion Nestle
notes, the food industry is heavily involved in drafting the guidelines
that influence the curriculum.
253
(last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
248. Channel One Network, About Channel One, http://www.channelone
.com/common/about/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2005).
249. SUSAN LINN, CONSUMING KIDS: THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF
CHILDHOOD 81-82 (2004).
250. SCHOR, supra note 198, at 129.
251. LINN, supra note 249, at 84.
252. See MARION NESTLE, FOOD POLITICS: How THE FOOD INDUSTRY
INFLUENCES NUTRITION AND HEALTH 192 (2002).
253. See id. at 193-94.
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C. Advertising, Obesity, and Trust: Co-opting Social Networks
The social networks in place between children and their parents,
between children and their peers, and between children and other
adults, influence the type and amount of food that children consume.
Take children's influence over household purchases. "[C]hildren
aged four to twelve directly influenced $330 billion of adult
purchasing in 2004 and 'evoked' another $340 billion."
25 4
Companies research the relationships between children and their
parents and capitalize upon it to influence adult purchases.255 In
particular, companies have noted, and taken advantage of, the
commonly known fact that children nag their parents. 25 6 Nagging is
a major part of childhood development and is related to the necessary
separation of children from their parents and development of a
child's autonomy,25 7 As Susan Linn has observed, marketers seek to
capitalize on this 'developmental stage and rely upon the parent-child
relationship to promote their products. 25 8 Linn argues that we should
be concerned about this intrusion and the erosion of trust and
relationships. 25 9 Corporate use of nagging can exacerbate stress in
the family, can often cause parents to overindulge their children, and
has led to financial strain for families.
260
Heinz ketchup provides an excellent example of the use of the
nag factor. While it has now discontinued its line of color ketchups,
Heinz at one time introduced ketchup that came in green, purple and
blue colors.26' Heinz intended this transformation of ketchup to
spark nagging by kids for the product: "All our advertising is
targeted to kids. You want that nag factor so that seven-year-old
Sarah is nagging Mom in the grocery store to buy Funky Purple.
We're not sure Mom would reach out for it on her own.
'" 262
254. SCHOR, supra note 198, at 23.
255. See id. at 23-24.
256. LINN, supra note 249, at 35-36.
257. See id. at 32..
258. See id. at 35-36.
259. Id. at 31-32.
260. Id. at 32.
261. See H.J. Heinz Company Corporate Profile 2003, http://www.heinz.
com/jsp/di/corp_pro2003/corpProfile4.jsp (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
262. LINN, supra note 249, at 35 (quoting Kelly Stitt, Senior Brands
Manager for Heinz's Ketchup, Condiments & Sauces Division).
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Kraft Foods has also taken advantage of the nag factor with its
Lunchables. Blurring the line between toys and food, Kraft promotes
Lunchables heavily to children and has tried to market the product
both as a toy that children can nag arents for and as a healthy
alternative for overworked parents.26F The recent promotion of
Lunchables ties the popular food to the recent release of "The
Fantastic Four. '264 The Fantastic Four promotion was tied to an
online game that allowed the child to advance to higher levels with
special codes that are found in the Lunchables packaging. To
advance, the child had to purchase the Lunchables (or have Mom or
Dad do it).
Juliet Schor points to the revitalization of the Kool-Aid brand as
a prime example of not only industry reliance on nagging but of
industry mining of parent-child relationships. Kool-Aid created two
sets of ads. 265 The first, directed at children, espoused the "cool and
magical" character of Kool-Aid.266 The ads created desire in
children for the product.267 A second set of ads, run during adult
television-viewing hours, appealed to mothers. 268 These ads touted
the Vitamin C in the product and its health advantages "because
mothers can control the amount of sugar they put into it."269 Both
ads ran during the same time period.27° The first ad created the
desire in the child.2 7' The second provided the reasons for mothers
to acquiesce to the child's demand.272
263. Id. at 36-37. Recent ads for Lunchables tout the benefits of Lunchables
and extol their new "fun" activities for improving the food, for example, the
more the child shakes the chicken in the bag, the more spicy it will become.
Kraft Foods, Inc., Newsroom, http://164.109.46.215/newsroom/08032005.html
(last visited Nov. 18, 2005). Shaking the chicken becomes a form of
entertainment to "shake up" a boring lunch, which Kraft describes as the
"brown bag routine." Id.
264. Jonathan Bing, The Doom-Defying, Two-Fisted Marketing of Fantastic
Four, WIRED, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.07/fantastic_pr.html
(last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
265. SCHOR, supra note 198, at 59.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Id.
270. See id,
271. See id.
272. See id.
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To develop these ads, advertisers conduct enormous amounts of
ethnographic research in homes.273 They aim to understand the goals
of parents in feeding their children, to understand parental concepts
of "healthy foods," and to document the relationships between
parents and children. 274 This information then becomes the basis for
the food industry's advertising that seeks to exploit familial
relationships to sell products. 275  Schor recounts the experience of
one marketing researcher doing research for cookies. 276  The
researcher spent' time with the families, learned what mothers
considered "healthy," and examined how families interacted around
Oreo cookies. 277  This information was later used to design
campaigns that associated the products with words like "health" and
"wholesome."278
As noted above, the goal of such research is not to learn how to
convey information about the product itself.279 The research is used
to create images of a culture that children rely upon when they define
themselves and interact with others. Food becomes a communicative
symbol for the parents and children as industry capitalizes on the
trust in the parent-child relationship in order to facilitate consump-
tion. By targeting the parent-child relationship, food advertisers risk
straining a relationship that is critical not only for the well being of
individual children but for society writ large.
Moreover, research on commercial speech demonstrates that it
affects obesity by influencing the cultural and social environment.
28 0
As a result, speech is not simply a determinant of individual health; it
is a social determinant of population health. Hence, serious
discussions of potential interventions aimed at retarding the obesity
epidemic will under-standably include policies that may affect
speech. Whether the First Amendment may permit such policies is
discussed in the next Part.
273. Id. at 131.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See supra text accompanying note 210.
280. See SCHOR, supra note 198, at 126.
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V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIc HEALTH
A. Free Speech and Health
Over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has
increasingly read the First Amendment as providing broad and robust
immunity for speech.28' This protection permits an information
environment in which health information may be disseminated and
health policies can be debated.28 2 It also enables the public dialog
about health and health policies that are critical to the maintenance of
trust and social capital. Thus, broad First Amendment protection
may be supportive, if not necessary, for the development of an
informational environment that safeguards public health. Arguably,
that has been the case with respect to many health threats.
For example, when the AIDS epidemic developed in the 1980s,
there were no medical treatments available to counter the impact of
the HIV virus. 284 Control of the epidemic and prevention of death
required that individuals adopt less risky behaviors, that cultural
norms change, public policies be developed, and communities at
heightened risk trust health and public health workers.285 For each of
281. Modem First Amendment jurisprudence dates less than fifty years, to
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Previously, the Supreme Court's
approach to the First Amendment was far more guarded, leaving government
with considerable latitude for prohibiting many forms of speech. Id. at 447
(discussing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927)). In the years since
Brandenburg, the Court has decided many important cases expanding the
swath of protection afforded by the First Amendment. See, e.g., Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). As discussed in Part
III, this heightened degree of protection for speech can be understood in light
of the increasing importance of speech to our economic and social life and the
varying degrees of protection given different constitutional rights in different
eras.
282. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 146 (2000).
283. See id. at 147. In this way, First Amendment protection for speech
relating to health can be justified for the same reasons given to justify First
Amendment protection for political speech.
284. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Approval of AZT (Mar. 20,
1987), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/NEW00217.html (announcing
the first FDA-approved treatment of AIDS).
285. See Larry Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS LAW
TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC, supra note 60, at 59, 77-78.
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these to occur, all of the pathways through which speech influences
health populations had to be utilized. But given the sensitive, and
often sexually explicit, nature of the information, many objected to
the public conveyance of HIV-related information.28 6 In this case,
the broad protections offered by the First Amendment helped to
ensure the availability of information that the public needed to
protect health.28 7
However, free speech has not always benefited public health.
As discussed in Part IV, the informational environment includes
much information that may exacerbate the obesity problem. In
particular, the food industry and media have used speech in ways that
appear to have increased the incidence of overweight and obesity
among children, altering their culture and the public policies that
affect them. 288 Much, if not most, of this health-harming speech has
been commercial speech, in that it has been aimed directly at
promoting the sale of a product.289 Hence, an absolutist position on
the First Amendment, particularly as it applies to commercial speech,
may interfere with and impede the ability of governments (state
and/or federal) to intervene and protect children from a health-
impairing information environment.
In this Part, we explore how First Amendment law applies to
public health protection with respect to obesity as well as what it
would mean to integrate into First Amendment analysis a population-
based perspective that is cognizant of the multi-factorial, population-
based pathways by which speech affects public health. We focus our
286. For a discussion about these debates and the attempts that were made to
limit HIV-related speech, see RONALD BAYER, PRIVATE ACTS, SOCIAL
CONSEQUENCES 211-13 (1989); Burris, supra note 60, at 96-107.
287. See, e.g., AIDS Action Comm. of Mass., Inc. v. Mass. Bay Transp.
Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the Transit Authority's refusal
to run certain ads providing HIV information was a violation of the First
Amendment). In some situations, the First Amendment proved less efficacious
in ensuring free speech in the HIV context because governments attached
conditions limiting speech supported by government grants. Burris, supra note
60, at 100. As Burris notes, at the time, governments were given wide latitude
in attaching limitations on speech as a condition for receiving funding. Id. For
further discussion on government sponsored speech, see infra text
accompanying notes 420-26.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 182-252.
289. As many have recognized, it is often difficult to distinguish commercial
speech from other forms of speech. For a discussion of that problem, see Nike,
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 665-84 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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analysis on two aspects of First Amendment doctrine: those that
pertain to commercial and compelled speech, as they are the most
salient for the discussion of the application of First Amendment law
to efforts to limit the obesity epidemic. First, we introduce the
commercial speech doctrine. We then look at the law that pertains to
compelled speech, especially in a commercial context, because it is
also critical for public health efforts that use speech to reduce the
obesity epidemic:
B. Commercial Speech and the First Amendment
Since its inception thirty years ago, the contemporary
commercial speech doctrine has had a close association with issues
related to health care and public health.290 The current doctrine has
its roots in Bigelow v. Virginia,29 1 in which the Supreme Court
overturned a publisher's conviction for carrying advertisements in
violation of a Virginia statute making it illegal for any publication in
the state to encourage or promote an abortion.292 In finding the
Virginia statute unconstitutional, Justice Blackmun, writing for the
majority stated that "[t]he central assumption made by the Supreme
Court of Virginia was that the First Amendment guarantees of speech
and press are inapplicable to paid commercial advertisements. Our
cases, however, clearly establish that speech is not stripped of First
Amendment protection merely because it appears in that form."
293
290. Many of the initial cases concerned state regulation of medical services
in one form or another. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (1977) (regulation of advertising contraceptives); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)
(regulation of advertising drug prices); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975) (regulation of advertisements pertaining to abortion). Later cases often
concerned commercial speech regulations that aimed at protecting the public
health from dangerous goods. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525 (2001) (regulation of cigar and smokeless tobacco marketing); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (regulation of liquor
advertising).
291. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
292. Id. at 811,829.
293. Id. at 818 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 367, 384 (1973); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1964)). The Court then went on to distinguish an earlier case, Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942), in which the Court reached the opposite
conclusion and upheld the issuance of an injunction against the distribution of
handbill advertisements. Id. at 819.
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Despite the clarity of the majority's pronouncements, the fact that
Bigelow concerned an advertisement for abortion services and that
the Supreme Court had only recently articulated a woman's right to
an abortion, 294 left many uncertain whether the Court was signaling
wide-scale protection for commercial speech or simply providing
extra scrutiny for abortion regulations.
295
The Court provided the answer the following term in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc. 296 In striking down a Virginia law limiting the advertisement of
health care services, the majority explained that speech should not
lose its protection merely because the speaker utters it with an
economic intent.297 In support of this conclusion, the majority noted
the difficulty of distinguishing commercial speech from other forms
of speech298 and pointed out that "[t]he interests of the contestants in
a labor dispute are primarily economic, but it has long been settled
that both the employee and the employer are protected by the First
Amendment when they express themselves on the merits of the
dispute . ,299 In addition, the majority argued, consumers may
have "as keen, if not [a] keener" interest in receiving commercial
294. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
295. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760.
296. Id. (striking down a Virginia law prohibiting pharmacists from
advertising drug prices).
297. Id. at 762.
298. The difficulty in distinguishing commercial speech from other forms of
speech is certainly real, especially in today's informational environment in
which commercial products are marketed in forums other than traditional
advertising while traditional non-commercial sources of information, such as
the press, are increasingly owned by large conglomerates that exercise
influence over what is and is not said. See Collins & Skover, supra note 208,
at 698. In this environment, it would truly be difficult to determine what
speech is commercial and what is not. Another alternative approach to the
issue is to distinguish speech by the nature of the speaker. More precisely,
commentators have questioned whether the First Amendment should apply to
corporate speech, because corporations are state-created entities and should not
qualify for many of the personal, autonomy-based rationales that have been
used to explain the First Amendment's preference for speech. See Bruce
Ledewitz, Corporate Advertising's Democracy, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 389,
411 (2003). The problem with this approach, besides its lack of support by the
Court, is that it might fail to provide full First Amendment protection for many
organized advocacy groups, permitting the government to ban clearly political
discourse.
299. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
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information than other forms of information.
300
In finding the Virginia law unconstitutional, the majority also
relied heavily on the supposed benefits that commercial advertising
could provide to individuals. 30 1 For example, the Court pointed out
that a ban on drug pricing information could hurt the poor, sick, and
aged who could gain the most from learning where they could
purchase less expensive drugs.30 2 In addition, the majority contend-
ed that "society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information. Even an individual advertisement, though
entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public interest."3 3 Finally,
in perhaps the most telling part of the opinion, the majority noted
that:
[s]o long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise
economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure
will be made through numerous private economic decisions.
It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end,
the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
30 4
Nevertheless, the majority recognized that pharmacy advertising
might create some harm in that customers may be persuaded by
advertisements to choose discount pharmacists, who might not
necessarily serve them the best.30 5 But to take such concerns into
account and ban advertising, the majority charged, would be "highly
paternalistic." 30 6 Instead, the state should assume that "people will
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels
of communication rather than to close them." 307 Thus, the majority
300. Id. at 763.
301. See id. at 764--66.
302. Id. at 763.
303. Id. at 764.
304. Id. at 765.
305. Id. at 769.
306. Id. at 770. In the context of this case, the majority's disdain for
paternalism can be understood as an example of the anti-paternalism, patient
rights ethos that was ascendant in the 1970s and came (somewhat inaptly) to be
exemplified by Justice Blackmun's own opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973). For a discussion of the patient rights, anti-paternalism movement, see
David J. Rothman, The Origins and Consequences of Patient Autonomy: A 25-
Year Retrospective, in ETHICAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 150, at 91, 91-97.
307. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. These assumptions, that
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focused on the direct pathway, seeing advertisements as providing
information directly to individual, presumably rational, consumers
who could use that information to make their own, best, individual
choices.
Despite these arguments for placing commercial speech under
the umbrella of the First Amendment, 30 8 the Virginia Board of
Pharmacy Court recognized that "commonsense differences" exist
between commercial speech and other protected forms of speech
thereby justifying different degrees of constitutional protection.3°9 in
particular, the majority noted that the truth or falsehood of
commercial speech may be more easily determined by the speaker
than is the case with other forms of speech.310 Moreover, they
opined that commercial speech might be more "durable" and less
easily chilled than other forms of speech. 311 As a result, while the
First Amendment protected commercial speech, the Court left open
the degree, the extent, and the nature of permissible regulations
under the First Amendment.
In the years immediately following Virginia Board of
Pharmacy, the Court frequently confronted the question that case left
unanswered: under what circumstances would regulations of
commercial speech be upheld?312 In 1980, in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,3 13 the
advertisements inform individuals and that they can use this information in a
rational way to act in their own best interest, have been subject to substantial
critique. For a particularly powerful repudiation, see Collins & Skover, supra
note 208.
308. In doing so, the Court was deciding to treat commercial speech
differently from other forms of speech that the Court had held were
"4unprotected" and therefore outside of the scope of the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (holding that
"fighting words" are not protected by the First Amendment); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is not protected by the
First Amendment).
309. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24.
310. Id. The Court also made it clear that commercial speech that is false is
not protected. Id. at 771.
311. Id. at 772 n.24.
312. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)
(addressing a State's ability to regulate a lawyer's solicitation of clients); Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (addressing the regulation of advertisements
for routine attorney services).
313. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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Court provided an approach to answer the question. In a case
considering the constitutionality of a New York law banning electric
utilities from advertising to promote the use of electricity, Justice
Powell offered at four-pronged test for determining the permissible
scope of commercial speech regulations. 314  Under the Central
Hudson test, the Court begins by asking whether the speech
regulated promotes legal activity and, if so, whether the speech is
truthful and not misleading. 315 If the answer to both questions is yes,
the Court finds the speech worthy of protection and moves on to
additional parts of the test.3 1 6 The second prong asks whether the
government regulation serves a substantial interest.317 Under the
third prong, the Court asks whether the regulation directly advances
that interest.318 Finally, the fourth prong asks whether the regulation
is more expansive or burdensome than necessary.
319
From the outset, justices and commentators have criticized the
Central Hudson test. In a separate opinion in Central Hudson,
Justice Blackmun took issue with the test's endorsement of the idea
that the government could have a legitimate or substantial interest in
influencing an individual's economic decision.32 0 Focusing on how
speech influences individuals directly, rather than how it alters their
culture and environment, Justice Blackmun argued that the state
cannot "manipulate" individual choices or regulate speech, "absent
clear and present danger," because of speech's effect on the
public.321 As Justice Blackmun saw it, bans on truthful advertising
keep individuals ignorant-something the state simply may not
do.
322
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist found the Court's approach overly
restrictive of the state's ability to regulate. 323 After arguing that a
state had a special right to restrict the activities of a regulated
314. Id. at566.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
321. Id. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
322. Id. at 579 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)).
323. Id. at 584-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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monopoly, Rehnquist questioned the majority's faith in an unregu-
lated "marketplace of ideas. 324 Suggesting that commercial speech
should not be considered completely different from other commercial
activities, he noted that "[t]here is no reason for believing that the
marketplace of ideas is free from market imperfections any more
than there is to believe that the invisible hand will always lead to
optimum economic decisions in the commercial market."325  To
Justice Rehnquist, the majority had gone too far in treating
commercial speech akin to political speech, thereby deriving states
of their ability to promote the interests of their citizens. 6
In subsequent years, other justices have joined the criticism. For
example, Justice Thomas has adopted the critique of Justice
Blackmun and argued that by accepting the idea that a state can seek
to keep consumers ignorant in order to "manipulate" their behavior,
Central Hudson violates the First Amendment.327 Justice Scalia, on
the other hand, has suggested that the test has "nothing more than
policy intuition to support it."328 These criticisms of Central Hudson
have taken their toll. Litigants have frequently asked the Court to
reconsider the test.329 Moreover, the Court's application of the test
has been notably inconsistent. At times, the Court has applied the
test in a relatively loose way, suggesting that the Court would grant
the states considerable latitude in regulating commercial speech.330
324. Id. at 592.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 594.
327. 44 Liquormart, Inc., v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring); see also Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v.
United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy has also suggested that the test gives "insufficient protection to
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
328. 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 517 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Commentators have shared the view that the test is unprincipled and untenable.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, The Chickens Have Come Home to
Roost: Individualism, Collectivism and Conflict in Commercial Speech
Doctrine, 9 COMM. L. & POL'Y 237 (2004).
329. See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 554.
330. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 618 (1995)
(upholding a state bar rule prohibiting lawyers from sending communications
to prospective clients soliciting representation in personal injury matters);
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 419-20 (1993) (upholding a
federal law prohibiting the broadcast of lottery advertisements unless the
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At other times, especially in recent years, the Court has applied the
test with greater rigor, making it difficult for state regulations of
commercial speech to pass constitutional muster.
33'
Two relatively recent cases are especially indicative of both the
trajectory of the commercial speech doctrine as well as its potential
impact on public health regulations. The first case, Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,332 questioned the constitutionality of a
comprehensive set of regulations designed to shield children from
advertisements for cigars and smokeless tobacco. 333 In an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, the Court first re-affirmed and then applied the
Central Hudson test.334 The Court began by noting that only the
third and fourth parts of the test were actually at issue as the parties
had conceded both that the regulations pertained to truthful speech
about a legal product and that the state had an important interest in
preventing tobacco use by minors.335  The debate concerned the
relationship between the regulations and that state interest-whether
the state could show that the regulations directly advanced its interest
and were no broader than was needed to do so.
336
In analyzing these prongs of Central Hudson, the majority
acknowledged and reviewed the considerable empirical evidence that
demonstrated that advertising stimulated demand among minors for
lottery is state-run and the broadcaster is licensed by a state that runs a lottery);
Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 328-30 (1986)
(upholding a ban on the advertising of casino gambling).
331. See, e.g., Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 476-77 (1995)
(striking down a state law prohibiting the display of alcohol content on beer
labels). Commentators have noted the increasing rigor with which the Court
has reviewed commercial speech regulations. See Lawrence 0. Gostin & Gail
H. Javitt, Health Promotion and the First Amendment: Government Control of
the Informational Environment, 79 MILBANK Q. 547, 557-59 (2001).
332. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
333. Id. at 533-36. The state also promulgated regulations aimed at cigarette
marketing. Id. at 532. These regulations were struck down by the Court as
preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. Id. at 551.
334. Id. at 554-55.
335. Id. at 555. In his dissent, Justice Thomas questioned whether a state
had a legitimate interest in regulating speech aimed at children. Id. at 581
(Thomas, J., dissenting). He noted, "We have held consistently that speech
'cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."' Id. (quoting Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
336. Id. at 555-56.
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cigars and smokeless tobacco.337 In so doing, the majority seemed to
recognize that advertising does not only speak to individuals
rationally and directly, by offering them information, but also
indirectly and irrationally, by forming associations between products
and images such as Joe Camel.338 In accepting this preference-
formation effect of advertising, the majority came close to under-
standing that speech operates not only directly on individuals, but
also indirectly, by changing cultural patterns and associations.
339
What the majority did not see, however, was that its analysis cast
doubt on the rationale the Court had given in Virginia Board of
Pharmacy for providing strong constitutional protection for
commercial speech.34 °
After concluding in Lorillard Tobacco Co. that the state had
passed the third part of the Central Hudson test, the majority
nevertheless found the Massachusetts law unconstitutional, largely
on the theory that the regulations were overly broad and would place
an unnecessary burden on the interest of tobacco retailers and
manufacturers "in conveying truthful information about their
products to adults, and adults [who] have a corresponding interest in
receiving truthful information about tobacco products." 341 In
reaching this conclusion, the majority noted that regulations "cannot
unduly impinge on the speaker's ability to propose a commercial
transaction and the adult listener's opportunity to obtain information
about products." 342 The majority then found that the regulations did
just that because the ban on outdoor advertising within 1,000 feet of
a school or playground would prevent advertising in the vast
majority of locations in urban areas and would prohibit indoor
displays visible through windows as well as traditional outdoor
billboards. 343 As a result, tobacco purveyors would have little ability
to advertise or communicate to adults about their goods.
344
337. See id. at 560-61.
338. See id. at 561.
339. Id. at 558-61 (citing evidence in FDA studies of a direct correlation
between increased tobacco consumption among various population groups and
advertising efforts targeting those groups).
340. See supra text accompanying notes 300-07.
341. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564.
342. Id. at 565.
343. Id. at 562.
344. The Court found that the regulations barred oral communication in the
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Moreover, the majority concluded, the state's ban of point-of-sale
advertisements less than five feet high was both overbroad and
underbroad (because children can be taller or shorter than five feet)
as well as poorly targeted, since children could see advertisements
above their eye level.345
As we shall discuss below, from a public health perspective, the
majority's application of the fourth part of the Central Hudson test
was perplexing and problematic. It was perplexing because it
followed the Court's earlier conclusion that the state was pursuing a
legitimate goal as well as the recognition that advertising does far
more than provide rational consumers with useful information about
legitimate products; it shapes consumer preferences and creates
irrational associations for products. Yet, when the majority turned to
the fourth prong, they seemed to lose sight of those points and
instead saw advertising merely as helpful information that consumers
rely upon to make rational decisions.346 As a result, the majority
expressed great concern about the burdens the state regulations
imposed on advertisers and consumers and took pains to demand a
tight fit between the regulations and the state's asserted, and
determined-to-be-legitimate, goal.347 Had the majority recalled that
the advertising at issue operated not to provide information, but to
create demand and alter the environment in which both adults and
children make their decisions, the concerns about the regulations'
overbreadth should have been diminished.
The analysis was problematic for another reason. Traditionally,
when a court asks if a regulation is overly burdensome, it does so in
relationship to the stated goal.348 In other words, the question is not
whether a regulation is burdensome against some abstract, external
forbidden zones as well. See id. at 564.
345. Id. at 566. ,The Court did uphold regulations barring self-service
displays, finding that these regulations were not content-based speech
regulations. Id. at 568-69.
346. Id. at 565.
347. Id. at 561-65.
348. In other words, the fourth part of the test cannot be considered in
isolation from the second. The question is not whether a regulation is
burdensome in and of itself but whether it is more burdensome than necessary
to achieve its goal. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 565. As the Court
stated in Lorillard Tobacco Co., the fourth part of the test "requires a
reasonable fit between the means and ends of the regulatory scheme." Id. at
561.
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metric of burdensomeness, but whether it is overly burdensome in
relation to the state's regulatory interest. 349  When public health
protection is the state's goal, this means that the state should be
allowed to regulate only as far as is necessary to achieve the public
health goal. It does not and cannot mean that no burdens are
permitted, otherwise the state could never achieve its goal.
When looking at the outdoor advertising regulations, however,
the majority never inquired as to whether their breadth was necessary
to achieve the state's goal. They looked instead only at the extent of
the burdens the regulations imposed upon tobacco sellers and
customers.3 5 0 For example, they noted that the regulations would bar
outdoor advertising in most urban areas.35' This was too burden-
some, they posited, because it would keep advertisers from being
able to convey information to adult consumers.3 5 2  However, the
majority did not ask whether there were other less burdensome ways
that the state could achieve its goal of shielding minors from the
preference-forming impact of outdoor advertising. If one accepts, as
the majority did,I that that goal was a legitimate goal for a state to
pursue, and if one recalls that the goal was protecting not just an
individual child, but the state's population of children, then it stands
to reason that the state might have to implement fairly broad and
wide-spread regulations that require advertisers and adults to
communicate through other media (for example, inside stores, or in
adult-oriented print media).35 3 Thus, despite the opinion's initial
acceptance of limited regulations of commercial speech, the analysis
the Court applied was highly protective of commercial speech.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any regulation of cigar and smoke-
349. In Lorillard Tobacco Co., the majority accepted that the regulations
were sufficiently well-founded to survive the third part of the Central Hudson
test. See id. In other cases, the Court has accepted that the speech regulations
could in fact advance their stated goal. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505-07 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1995).
350. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 561-66.
351. Id. at 562-64.
352. Id. at 562.
353. The Court's conclusions regarding the regulations barring indoor
advertisements under five feet seem more supportable. It is difficult to deny
that children could' view advertisements that are 5.2 feet off the ground.
Hence, in contrast to the outdoor regulations, the point-of-sale regulations were
probably unlikely to have a major public health impact.
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less tobacco advertising significant enough to have a population-
health impact that could have 
survived the Court's review.
3 p
The Court's rigorous application of the Central Hudson test is
also evident in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center. 355 That
case concerned section 503A of the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA),35 6 which exempted com-
pounded drugs357 from the standard Food and Drug Administration
process so long as the providers of such drugs did not advertise
them.358 In an opinion again written by Justice O'Connor, the Court
found that the proviso barring advertisements failed the Central
Hudson test.359
Once again, the Court assumed that the speech at issue was
truthful and that the government was seeking to promote a legitimate
purpose: assuring the availability of compounding drugs without
opening them up to commercial exploitation.3 6 0 The problem, as the
Court saw it, came from the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test,
354. In order for a regulation to have a substantial health-improving impact
across a broad population, it must necessarily be wide enough in its scope to
affect many people. Indeed, as Geoffrey Rose has shown, policies that affect
many people in minor or subtle ways may have a greater population effect than
those that affect a few at-risk people significantly. See Geoffrey Rose, Sick
Individuals and Sick Populations, in ETHICAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 150,
at 37, 37-44.
355. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
356. 21 U.S.C. § 353a (2000).
357. According to the Court:
Drug compounding is a process by which a pharmacist or doctor
combines, mixes, or alters ingredients to create a medication tailored
to the needs of an individual patient. Compounding is typically used
to prepare medications that are not commercially available, such as
medication for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient in a mass-
produced product.
Thompson, 535 U.S. at 360-61.
358. 21 U.S.C. § 353a(c).
359. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368-77.
360. Because-they are individualized, compounding drugs cannot readily be
subject to the typical FDA approval process. See id at 362. On the other
hand, the government was concerned that their exemption could be misused by
manufacturers to attempt to bypass FDA approval. See id. The government
argued that by barring advertising, the FDAMA drew a line, making it likely
that compounding would be used only in small-scale, individualized
operations, and that manufacturers would not seek to exploit the compounding
exemption because they would not want to lose their ability to advertise. See
id. at 370.
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which the Court stated required the government to show that it could
not achieve its purpose by any manner less restrictive of speech.361
In the instant case, the Court hypothesized several nonspeech related
approaches that the government could use to advance its goal.362 For
example, the Court suggested, the government could ban the use of
commercial scale manufacturing or testing equipment by compound-
ing pharmacists, or it could ban the sale of compounded drugs to
wholesale or retail establishments. 363  Likewise, the government
could prohibit pharmacists from compounding drugs except in
response to a specific prescription.
364
In his dissent, Justice Breyer explained why the methods
suggested by the majority would not suffice to achieve the
government's goal of limiting the demand for compounded drugs to
those patients who actually need them.365  According to Justice
Breyer, compounding was inherently dangerous, as it offered
customers drugs that were unapproved and not tested for safety.
366
For patients who have contraindications for commercially-available
drugs, the added risks of using an untested compounded drug may
well be worth the benefit.367 That would not be the case for most
individuals.368 Yet, as Justice Breyer explained, "[t]here is consi-
derable evidence that consumer oriented advertising will create
strong consumer-driven demand for a particular drug. ' 369  By
banning that advertising, the FDAMA could prevent the creation of
such a (medically unnecessary and dangerous) demand for com-
pounded drugs, leaving the consumer demand to that created by
medical need.370
361. Id. at 371.
362. Id. at 372.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See id. at 378-79 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
366. Id. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
367. Id. at 380 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
368. Id. at 383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
369. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
370. Id. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer noted that the
creation of this demand was not an individualistic or atomistic process, nor did
it affect only individuals. Id. at 387 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He noted, "Those
consequences flow from the adverse cumulative effects of multiple individual
decisions each of which may seem perfectly reasonable considered on its own.
The Government fears that, taken together, these apparently rational individual
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In response, the majority dismissed Justice Breyer's explanation,
noting first that the government had not argued the point in its brief,
and second that the argument was based on "a fear that people would
make bad decisions if given truthful information about compounded
drugs." 371 Quoting from Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the majority
reiterated that bans on truthful advertising cannot be sustained based
on paternalistic principles.372 The majority also reasserted that as
long as advertisihg was not misleading, the government could not
seek to keep the information from people.
373
In rejecting Justice Breyer's concerns about advertising's ability
to create demand, and in resting upon the Virginia Board of
Pharmacy assertion that the government cannot keep individuals
from access to truthful information, Justice O'Connor and the
Western States majority374 focused the Central Hudson test squarely
on the first, direct-to-individual pathway of speech.375 Commercial
speech was understood as information that individual, rational actors
could use to make decisions they believed to be within their own
interest.376 The other, population-based ways that information
affects individuals and populations, and thus public health, were
either overlooked or dismissed. As a result, the Court left us with
not only a very stringent test for commercial speech, but with one
that, as it is now being applied, appears poorly suited to discern the
myriad ways in which speech can harm public health and unable to
appreciate the limited options that government has to fulfill its
traditional role of protecting public health in an information era.
decisions will undermine the safety testing system, thereby producing overall a
net balance of harm." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
371. Id. at 374.
372. See id. at 375.
373. The Court also claimed that the regulations went too far, in that they
would preclude advertising even in those situations in which individuals would
benefit from compounded drugs. See id. at 376.
374. Justice O'Connor was joined in her opinion by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas. Id. at 359. Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and
Ginsburg joined with Justice Breyer in dissent. Id.
375. Id. at 366-67 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976)).
376. Id. at 367 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)).
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C. Compelled Speech
Speech influences health not only by its presence but also by its
absence. The absence of some information, especially in the
presence of other information, can be incomplete or misleading. It
can give false iipressions and undermine trust. It can deprive
individuals and the body politic of information that can positively
influence public health.
Governments have long sought to counter the negative impact of
the absence of information by compelling individuals and entities to
disclose information when they engage in particular risk-creating
actions. For example, the common law doctrine of informed consent
requires that health care providers inform patients about the risks and
benefits associated with medical procedures.377 While that body of
law largely reflects concerns for individual autonomy,378 the
common law requirement that health care providers inform patients
about the risks associated with their medical options also has public
health ramifications, as informed consent can help improve the
chances that patients will make appropriate treatment decisions.
379
In addition, the provision of information from provider to patient, or
from public health official to community at risk, can instill trust and
increased compliance with and support for recommended actions.
380
The common tort law principle that manufacturers must provide
warnings about the dangers associated with their product may also be
viewed as a legal measure that compels speech in order to protect the
public health.3 8' By holding manufacturers liable when injuries have
resulted from undisclosed dangers, this obligation provides manu-
facturers with an additional incentive to make their products less
dangerous. 382 At the same time, it provides consumers with infor-
377. For a review of the law of informed consent, see FURROW ET AL.,
HEALTH LAW 310-43 (2d ed. 2000).
378. See Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of
Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE 210, 210 (1988).
379. See Parmet, supra note 160, at 92-97.
380. See id. at 97-100.
381. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998).
382. The question whether tort law actually deters injuries is well beyond the
scope of this article. For a discussion, see Edward A. Dauer, When the Law
Gets in the Way: The Dissonant Link of Deterrence and Compensation in the
Law of Medical Malpractice, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 293, 295-97 (2000)
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mation that they can use when making decisions as to how or
whether to use a product. This information can enter the public
realm, and, at least in some circumstances, affect not only the health
of the individual consumers who see the warnings, but others, as the
information enters the culture and influences social norms and public
policies.
38 3
Legislative and regulatory laws aimed at protecting public health
have also frequently included mandates to disclose information or
provide warnings. 384 As Lawrence 0. Gostin recounts:
[G]overnment requires businesses to label their products by
specifying the content or ingredients (e.g., foods and
cosmetics), the potential adverse effects (e.g., pharma-
ceuticals and vaccines), and the hazards (e.g., warnings on
packages of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, or pesticides).
Second, government provides a "right to know" for
consumers (e.g., performance of managed care organi-
zations), workers (e.g., health and safety risks), and the
public (e.g., hazardous chemicals in drinking water). Third,
government mandates counter-advertising whereby industry
or the media must provide health education as a counter-
balance to advertisements of hazardous products (e.g.,
forced dissemination of anti-drinking or anti-smoking
messages).385
(discussing literature pertaining to the deterrent effect of malpractice law);
Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L.
REV. 115 (1993) (discussing social learning theory as applied to tort law and
suggesting the need for a modification of the tort system to increase deterrence
of undesirable behavior); Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Liability and
Insurance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving, 38 J.L. & ECON. 49,
49-50 & n.1 (1995) (discussing an empirical study of the deterrent effect of
tort liability and noting the dearth of such studies).
383. Thus, warnings for commonly used products can become part of the
common knowledge within a society and influence its views and customs with
regard to a product, as well as the policies it enacts. Moreover, warnings read
by an individual user of a product can reduce the chance that the user's use of
the product will harm a third party. For a further discussion of how
information to individual consumers can operate at this social or population
level, see supra text accompanying notes 109-40, 145-62.
384. GosTiN, supra note 282, at 165.
385. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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In each of these instances, and many others, governments compel
speech in order to influence the informational environment to be
conducive to public health.
38 6
Applying the First Amendment to such public-health oriented
compelled speech is both problematic and unsettled. Although both
the common law and state and federal regulations have long
compelled warnings and disclosures, the Supreme Court has never
squarely considered whether or when such public health mandates
violate the First Amendment. Moreover, the trajectory of the Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence suggests that such requirements may
face substantial constitutional hurdles.
387
The first Supreme Court case to hold that the First Amendment
limits the government's ability to compel speech was West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette.388 In that case, the Supreme
Court, per Justice Stone, struck down a state statute that required
schoolchildren to salute the flag while saying the Pledge of
Allegiance. 389  Locating the issue in the core of the First
Amendment, the Court observed that:
386. Governments also attempt to shape the informational environment by
engaging in speech, for example, by issuing reports and studies, providing
sources of public information (Web sites, handbills, etc.), and sponsoring
advertisements. Like other forms of speech, government speech can influence
health via multiple pathways. At times government may seek not simply to
inform, but, like other forms of advertising, to manipulate, create associations,
and alter social meanings. See id. at 151. Government may also use its ability
to disseminate information in ways that may be harmful to public health.
Hence, governments have sponsored advertising campaigns to increase the
consumption of beef, despite concerns about the high level of fat in most
Americans' diets. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct. 2055,
2058, 2072 n.7 (2005). Courts, however, have not found the First
Amendment's speech provisions (in contrast to its religious provisions) to limit
governments' own speech. See, e.g., id. at 2062 (holding that an assessment of
funds from the beef industry to pay for beef advertising is not unconstitutional
because it supports government speech). For an especially interesting
discussion and rejection of a First Amendment challenge to a government-
sponsored counter-advertising campaign, see RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
Shewry, 384 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding a California law that applied
a cigarette surtax to finance anti-tobacco advertising).
387. The First Amendment applies to common law, as well as statutory law.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
388. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
389. 1d.
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[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
390
The Supreme Court revisited the application of the First
Amendment to government-compelled speech over thirty years later
in Wooley v. Maynard,39' in which the Court held that the state of
New Hampshire could not compel drivers to display the motto "live
free or die" on their license plates.392 Once again, the Court saw the
state's action as violating core principles of the First Amendment.
393
According to the majority, "[t]he First Amendment protects the right
of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and
to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea
they find morally objectionable.
' 394
Subsequent cases expanded upon the type of compelled speech
protected by the First Amendment. For example, in Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Environment,395 and later, in Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc.,396 the Court applied
full First Amendment protection to state laws requiring charities to
make certain disclosures about their financial solicitations. 397  In
Riley, while rejecting the state's claim that compelled speech should
be treated differently from prohibited speech, the Court asserted that
"the difference is without constitutional significance, for the First
Amendment guarantees 'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily
comprising the decision of both what to say and what not to say."
398
Taken at face value, this statement would raise serious constitutional
390. Id.
391. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
392. Id. at 717. Another early compelled speech case relied upon in Wooley
was Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), in which
the Court struck down a law that required newspapers to publish the replies of
political candidates they had criticized. Id. at 241, 258.
393. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
394. Id. at 715.
395. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
396. 487 U.S. 781 (1988). Another case raising similar issues was Secretary
of Maryland v. Joseph H, Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
397. Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-97; Schawnburg, 444 U.S. at 624, 636.
398. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97.
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questions for laws (statutory, regulatory or tort) that compel the
disclosure of health information.
However, several factors have created uncertainty in the
application of these cases to most compelled public health
disclosures. First, as was noted above, although the Supreme Court
finds that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Court has also recognized (over the objection of some
Justices) that differences exist between commercial speech and other
forms of speech and has continued to adhere to the Central Hudson
test when commercial speech is at issue.399 As seen in our discussion
of Lorillard Tobacco Co. and Western States, courts can apply this
test in such a manner as to approach the rigorous strict scrutiny they
utilize for non-commercial speech cases, but the Central Hudson
test, on its face, also leaves courts with more "wiggle room" to
uphold compelled speech in commercial speech cases.4 0 0 That the
Court might take advantage of this wiggle room in cases concerning
compelled speech was evident in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel,40' in which the Court considered a state law regulating
I1 402attorney advertising. After finding that the First Amendment
barred the state's attempt to ban the inclusion of certain information
in attorney ads, the Court rejected the claim that the same outcome
was required with respect to the state's demand that attorneys include
information about fee arrangements in their advertisements.
40 3
Distinguishing Barnette and Wooley, the Court held that the
state's interests in the case at hand were dissimilar to those at issue in
the Court's other compelled-speech cases.40 4 The state was not
trying to compel orthodoxy or force an opinion on anyone.
40 5
Instead, the state was simply demanding that certain factual
information be included in advertising.4 6 Because the protection
given to commercial speech was justified, in part, by the fact that
advertising can provide consumers with information, the Court
treated requirements that commercial parties provide such infor-
399. See supra text accompanying notes 308-35.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 332-74.
401. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
402. Id. at 629.
403. Id. at 647, 65,3.
404. Id. at 651.
405. Id.
406. Id.
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mation differently than other forms of compulsory speech.40 7  In
addition, the Court noted that in many commercial speech cases, the
justices had pointed to the possibility of requiring information or
labels as a less restrictive approach to the advertising bans that were
before the Court.40 8  In other words, compelled speech might be
understood as the preferred alternative that a party challenging a
speech ban could point to when asserting that a ban on speech
violates the fourth prong of Central Hudson.40 9 If that were the case,
and if states were to have any viable less restrictive means of
protecting the public from harms associated with advertising,
compelled speech might at times have to be accepted.410
An additional rationale for the idea that the Court may be, at
least in some circumstances, more tolerant of compelled commercial
speech than bans on such speech comes from the Court's decision in
407. Id. In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Brennan agreed that a state may impose advertising disclosure requirements
that are 'reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception'
but disagreed that the State had met that standard. Id. at 656 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 651).
408. 1d. at 651. Commentators have also argued that "between suppressing
certain commercial messages altogether and permitting them with mandatory
disclosures to guard against fraud, the First Amendment supports the use of
disclosure requirements in the first instance." George W. Evans & Arnold I.
Friede, The Food and Drug Administration's Regulation of Prescription Drug
Manufacturer Speech: A First Amendment Analysis, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
365, 379 (2003). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia seems to
have adopted this reasoning, noting in a case rejecting the FDA's demand that
it approve health claims on dietary supplements that "when government
chooses a policy of suppression over disclosure-at least where there is no
showing that disclosure would not suffice to cure misleadingness-
government disregards a 'far less restrictive' means." Pearson v. Shalala, 164
F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
409. In a separate opinion, Justices Brennan and Marshall agreed with the
majority that disclosure requirements should be assessed differently from bans
on speech. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 656 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Nevertheless, they did not believe that the state's "vague"
requirements were reasonably related to the state's goal. Id.
410. In an opinion dissenting from the denial of a writ of certiorari in
Borgner v. Florida Board of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting), Justice Thomas questioned a broad reading of Zauderer and
argued that the Court's opinions "have not presumptively endorsed
government-scripted disclaimers or sufficiently clarified the nature and the
quality of the evidence a State must present to show that the challenged
legislation directly advances the governmental interest asserted." Id. at 1082.
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Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott.4 11 In that case, the Court
reviewed a First Amendment challenge to Department of Agriculture
regulations that assessed fruit growers to finance generic advertising
for the industry.412 In upholding the regulations, the Court disting-
uished the marketing orders from others it had struck down on
several grounds.413 First, the Court noted, the marketing orders
imposed "no restraint on the freedom of any producer to commu-
nicate any message to any audience. Second, they do not compel any
person to engage in any actual or symbolic speech. Third, they do
not compel the producers to endorse or to finance any political or
ideological views." 414  The Court then argued that its compelled
speech doctrine only applied when the compelled speech required
parties to express messages and associate themselves with ideas to
which they do not subscribe. 415  Because the advertising at issue
would not be "attributed" to the growers, it could not be viewed as
compelled speech.416  Finally, the Glickman Court noted that the
assessments under challenge were part of a complex regulatory
scheme that tied together the economic interests of fruit growers.
417
Because of the comprehensiveness of the regulations, the Court
suggested that the assessments could be viewed as part of an
economic regulation that contraindicated the traditional heightened
standard for First Amendment challenges.4 18 This "context" leaves
open the possibility that other regulations compelling speech as part
of a complex regulatory scheme may be distinguished from "simple"
compelled speech cases.419
411. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
412. Id. at 460-61.
413. Id. at 469-70.
414. Id. (citations omitted). To understand this case, it is important to note
that the Court had previously accepted the proposition that laws compelling
parties to financially support private speech also fell within the purview of the
First Amendment. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222
(1977). In other words, the compelled speech doctrine extends not simply to
laws that compel speech itself, but to laws that compel the support of speech.
It does not, however, extend to laws that assess or tax individuals to pay for the
government's own speech. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 125 S. Ct.
2055, 2062 (2005).
415. Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470-71.
416. See id. at 471.
417. Id. at 469.
418. Id.
419. Evans and Friede make this point in arguing that some, but not all, of
May 2006]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:363
The Court's approach in Glickman, however, may not endure.
In Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n,420 the Court utilized a
different approach questioning upholding the Beef Promotion and
Research Act, which, like the statute at issue in Glickman, assessed
producers in order to pay for generic advertisements. 421 Despite the
fact that the speech at issue seemed to contradict the government's
own public health messages that advise the public to reduce the
intake of trans fats that come from animal fat,422 the majority found
that the speech at issue was the government's own speech and that
individuals have no right to refuse to pay taxes that support
government speech.423 Thus, as long as the government is the
speaker, parties can be compelled to provide financial support for the
message whether it is beneficial or harmful to public health.424
Johanns should make clear that government attempts to
influence the information environment by sponsoring speech should
be relatively free from First Amendment attack.425  This would
the Food and Drug Administration's regulations pertaining to the labeling and
marketing of prescriptions could withstand constitutional muster. See Evans &
Friede, supra note 408, at 367, 387.
420. 125 S. Ct. 2055 (2005).
421. 1d. at 2061. Another similar case undermining Glicknan was United
States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001). In that case, the Court
distinguished Glicknan and Zauderer, and held that the Mushroom Promotion,
Research, and Consumer Information Act violated the First Amendment by
compelling growers to pay an assessment for food advertisements for
mushrooms. Id. at 415-16.
422. See Johanns, 125 S. Ct. at 2067-68 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
423. 1d, at 2062.
424. See id. In dissent, Justice Souter agreed with the principle that in
general, there could be no First Amendment objections to government speech.
See id. at 2071 (Souter, J., dissenting). However, he argued that unless the
speech was put forth as the government's, so that the government would stand
clearly accountable for its content, it could not be viewed as government
speech. See id. at 2071-72. Because the advertisements at issue in the case
were marked simply with the logo "Beef' and did not identify themselves as
the product of the United States government, the advertisements could not be
considered government speech. See id. at 2072 n.6.
425. This statement is, perhaps, overly broad. When government speaks, it
does so through the voices of its employees or grantees. Attempts by the
government to influence their message may be the subject of an entirely
different sort of First Amendment challenge, pertaining to the rights of
government employees, or the imposition of so-called unconstitutional
conditions. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569
(1998) (upholding a restriction on grants given by the National Endowment for
428
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appear to give governments fairly wide purview to use their own tax
dollars in attempts to influence the information environment to
protect public health (or to convey messages harmful to public
health). Thus, with respect to obesity, governments may include
nutrition education in the public school curriculum and sponsor
public service announcements aimed at encouraging children to eat
healthy foods and be physically active. Johanns does not, however,
clarify the constitutional status of regulations that seek to protect
public health by compelling accurate labeling or the disclosure of
warnings.426 Indeed, the Johanns Court's failure to follow the
approaches laid out in either Glickman or Zauderer may indicate
some discomfort with their potentially broader protection for
regulations compelling speech.42 If so, in the years to come, Central
Hudson, in all of its rigor, may be applied more frequently to public
health laws compelling speech.428 If so, the information environ-
ment's impact on public health may well depend upon an application
of the Central Hudson test that is sensitive to public health and the
ways in which it is affected by speech.
the Arts); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (upholding a preliminary
injunction against a county for firing employees because of their political
affiliations).
426. Some lower courts have considered the application of the First
Amendment to anti-fraud laws. See, e.g., United States v. Wenger, 292 F.
Supp. 2d 1296 (D. Utah 2003) (upholding a Securities Act conviction for
failure to disclose and finding that the disclosure demands were a justified
limitation on commercial speech).
427. United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001), distinguished
both Glickman and Zauderer. Id.. at 412-16.
428. This discussion assumes that the Courts will deem that these laws
compel commercial speech. However, the definition of commercial speech is
uncertain, and it will not always be easy to decide whether courts should treat
the particular speech at issue as commercial speech or pure speech. E.g.,
Wenger, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1296, 1302. In the case of compelled speech
relating to public health in general or to obesity, there may be many
circumstances in which challengers could claim that the speech at issue is not
commercial, but scientific or policy-oriented, and therefore should not have to
include mandated warnings or labels. See Evans & Friede, supra note 408, at
404-05; see also PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AND ETHICS, supra note 32, at 353-55
(pointing to paid editorials or "advertorials" by tobacco companies as
examples of speech that is hard to classify).
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VI. A POPULATION-BASED PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC HEALTH
Public health and the First Amendment may be on a collision
course. As we have suggested, speech is an important determinant of
population health. In the case of childhood obesity, both commercial
speech and compelled speech play critical roles.429  Thus, if
government is to intervene and protect children from the dangers of
obesity, it must intervene in the information environment both by
compelling truthful and informative speech and by containing the
impact of speech that alters the culture, social trust, and public policy
in health-threatening ways.
The First Amendment, however, is increasingly viewed as a
favored right, and recent applications of the commercial speech
doctrine suggest that future government efforts to regulate the infor-
mation environment are more likely than those in the past to face
very stringent, if not fatal, review. 43 0  If so, government will be
denied a key tool for protecting the public's health.43'
This outcome is unnecessary. We do not need to abandon
respect for the First Amendment to enable government to protect
public health. Instead, we must apply existing doctrine with a
recognition of the enduring relationship between constitutional rights
and public health, as well as with an appreciation of the many ways
that speech affects the health of populations. 432 By applying existing
429. See supra Part IV for a discussion of commercial speech and its effect
on the obesity epidemic. See supra Part V.C for a discussion of the possible
governmental use of compelled speech to affect the obesity epidemic.
430. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
431. We do not claim that First Amendment doctrine will prevent the
government from asserting any influence over the information environment
pertinent to obesity. As we have noted previously, the First Amendment
leaves the government wide room to engage in its own speech. See supra text
accompanying notes 418-25. Hence, the government can participate in the
information environment and disseminate information, including counter-
advertising, that it believes to be helpful. In addition, the government can
support, via grants, the speech efforts of public health advocates who attempt
to influence the informational environment. While not trivial, we suspect that
these efforts would prove in themselves insufficient, especially if courts read
the compelled speech doctrine to limit labeling requirements and disclosures.
432. It is important here to recall, as we have previously noted, that speech
can be beneficial to public health. If we did not have some protections for the
dissemination of controversial information, we might, thereby, jeopardize
public health. See supra text accompanying notes 58-108, 167-69. Moreover,
430
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doctrine from a population-based perspective, courts can protect
speech while leaving government with enough room to protect
children from the health dangers posed by the information
environment. In the sections that follow we sketch what that would
mean.
A population-based perspective can be understood as
comprising several normative and methodological elements,
including a recognition that public health protection is an appropriate
and important role for law, an understanding of the agency and
nature of populations, and a reliance upon empirical observation to
inform legal decision making.433 As we demonstrate below, these
elements are not foreign to extant First Amendment doctrine.
Rather, they can be understood as required, but not consistently
applied, by existing First Amendment case law. Below, we consider
each of these elements, explain what they entail and suggest how
they can help to modulate the potential clash between contemporary
First Amendment jurisprudence and efforts to curtail the obesity
epidemic. I
A. Public Health as a Norm
The essential attribute of population-based legal analysis 434 is
scientific discourse, and therefore progress, may be stymied. See Martin H.
Redish, Product Health Claims and the First Amendment: Scientific
Expression and the Twilight Zone of Commercial Speech, 43 VAND. L. REV.
1433, 1435 (1990) (arguing for the concept of epistemological humility,
because "whatever the currently prevailing beliefs may be, history teaches us
that scientific or moral advances may at some future point make those beliefs
appear either silly. or monstrous"). Finally, the lack of access to such
information may diminish trust and social capital. See supra text
accompanying notes 145-78.
433. For further discussion, see Wendy E. Parmet & Anthony Robbins,
Public Health Literacy for Lawyers, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 701, 706-08
(2003).
434. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 1233-37. Under this approach, public
health plays the role that efficiency or welfare plays under an economic
approach to the law. See id. at 1234. The idea that public health should be one
of the goals of the law is neither new nor surprising. Not only can it be
recognized in the common law maxim, salus populi suprema lex (the health or
well-being of the people is the supreme law), but it is expressed frequently, if
not explicitly, in the legions of cases and legal commentary that accept that the
attainment of public goals and "policy" outcomes constitute a legitimate aim of
legal analysis.
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the recognition that protecting and improving public health is an
appropriate, if not essential, goal of legal and policy decision
making.435 This does not mean that public health is the only goal
that judges or legislatures should consider. Other values, such as
individual autonomy, equality, fidelity to precedent, and respect for
democratic decision making are also of critical importance.436 A
population-based legal analysis does not denigrate those values or
argue that they should be sacrificed in the name of public health. It
merely asserts that protection of public health is one among the many
goals that need to be taken into account in deciding difficult cases
and determining the course of doctrine.
Such an approach is compatible with and may demand respect
for freedom of speech. Indeed, this approach closely aligns with the
leading arguments for protecting free speech as well as the Central
Hudson test.437 In American law, the classic justification for First
Amendment protection came from a series of opinions by Justice
Holmes in 1919.438 In these cases, he formulated the now common-
place notion of a "marketplace of ideas," arguing that speech should
not be easily censored precisely because we cannot know a priori
which ideas are true and which are false.439  Given uncertainty,
Holmes argued, we should be wary about limiting speech or ideas
that popular opinion now sees as false but which may later prove to
be true. 440 In addition, it is only by allowing the airing and, indeed,
competition between ideas that falsehoods can be exposed and
society can move closer to the adoption of true or perhaps simply
sensible policies.
44I
435. Id. at 1234.
436. Indeed, it may well be that many, if not most, of these other goals are
generally compatible with public health protection. One should not fall into
the law school trap of assuming that life presents nothing but dichotomies and
difficult choices, where one must make tragic decisions.
437. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980); supra text accompanying notes 313-428.
438. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48-53 (1919).
439. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
440. Id.
441. Id.
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Importantly, Holmes' justification for free speech was
consequentialist. : Holmes did not suggest that courts should give
broad protection to speech because speech itself is special or
exceptional.442 Nor did he suggest that speech be given greater
deference than other constitutionally-protected rights.4 4  Rather, he
argued that courts should give speech considerable constitutional
protection because that is the best wa, in a fallible world, to test
ideas and adopt those most worthy. Moreover, according to
Holmes, the government could override claims of free speech, like
other claims for other rights, when the speech at issue creates a
"clear and present" harm to others.445 Thus, Holmes saw the right to
free speech not as a trump on public policy, but as its handmaiden;
not as a right apart from and above our constitutional traditions, but
one very much in alliance with them.
Holmes' consequentialist argument for free speech left unan-
swered a major question: what are the ends that necessitate or justify
free speech? Writing at the end of World War I, in the wake of the
Bolshevik Revolution, Holmes clearly contemplated that a nation's
security during a time of war was among those ends that would
benefit from judicial protection of speech. 4 6 However, the security
and wellbeing of a population does not only depend upon its military
strength, or even its economic and political systems. It is also a
function of the health of the populations that comprise it. Indeed,
writing as he did immediately after the influenza pandemic of 1918,
which killed far more people than did the Great War,447 Holmes was
probably well aware of the impact that epidemics can wreak upon
442. See id. at 624-31.
443. See id.
444. Id. at 630.
445. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Holmes' approach to
the issue in Abrams, however, was far more protective of speech than was his
approach in Schenck. Compare Abrams, 250 U.S. at 629-30 (arguing that the
defendants had as much of a right to publish the leaflets in question as the
government had to publish the U.S. Constitution), with Schenck, 249 U.S. at
52-53 (holding that the defendants violated the Espionage Act of 1917 by
mailing circulars to obstruct recruiting and enlistment, and this conviction did
not violate their First Amendment rights).
446. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
447. See GINA KOLATA, FLU: THE STORY OF THE GREAT INFLUENZA
PANDEMIC OF 1918 AND THE SEARCH FOR THE VIRUS THAT CAUSED IT 7
(1999).
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communities. 44
8
Justice Brandeis offered an alternate, but also influential,
rationale for the First Amendment in his concurrence (which Holmes
joined) in Whitney v. California.449 In that case, Justice Brandeis
reminded us that "[t]hose who won our independence believed that
the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should
prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as
a means."
450
On its face, this quote would seem to proffer a non-
consequentialist rationale for free speech. Free speech is not only
valuable because it can lead to truth or beneficial public policies, but
also because it is an aspect of the liberty that the founders created the
state to preserve. From this perspective, speech may rightly be
understood as an end unto itself.
Nevertheless, Justice Brandeis did not suggest that free speech
was the highest or ultimate end of the state. The end of the state, he
argued, "was to make men free to develop their faculties.",45 ' That
implies that the state needs to protect not only speech, an important
vehicle for the expression of human faculties, but also human life
and health, which are also essential for the development and
expression of human faculties.452 This suggests that the protection of
speech should not be so absolute as to jeopardize the development of
human health and, thereby, human autonomy.
That speech must co-exist with protection for public health is
evident in the Supreme Court's own commercial speech cases. In
cases such as Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., and even Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
the Court recognized that governments could limit speech to protect
a substantial state interest and that protection of public health was
448. See Mark P. Painter, From Revolution to Reconstruction, Biographies:
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (May 5, 2005), http://odur.let.rug.nl/-usa/
B/oliver/oliverxx.htm (noting that Holmes' father was a doctor).
449. 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
450. Id. at 375.
451. Id.
452. See Norman Daniels & James E. Sabin, Last Chance Therapies and
Managed Care: Pluralism, Fair Procedures, and Legitimacy, 28 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 27, 27 (1998).
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such an interest. 45 3  Hence, the Court has always insisted that
reasonable, and not overly burdensome regulations of commercial
speech aimed at promoting public health are constitutional.454 The
problem has been the Court's determination of whether a state
regulation, in fact, meets that standard. A population-based approach
offers the tools and methods for making such a determination.
B. A Population Perspective
Population-based legal analysis adopts a population
perspective. 455 In contrast with the individualism predominant in
American law, a population-based perspective recognizes that
populations, or groups, are important subjects for legal analysis and
that decisions and actions occur and impact differently within a
group context.456 As a result, population-based legal analysis does
not treat populations merely as the sum of their individual members,
but as entities with their own, important-to-understand, dynamics.
457
A population focus brings two critical elements to the appli-
cation of the First Amendment to health-impairing speech. First, in
complement with the normative treatment of population health
discussed above, a population perspective views the First Amend-
453. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570-71 (2001); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976).
454. See GOSTIN, supra note 282, at 166.
455. A population perspective is generally taken to be the hallmark of the
discipline of public health. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 1234. For a prime and
influential example of what it means to adopt a population approach, see Rose,
supra note 354, at 37-44.
456. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 1234-35. In this regard, there are
important commonalities between population-based legal theory and a
communitarian approach to the law. Both understand that individuals are
situated within groups of people and that care must be given to appreciate the
importance of those groups. Id. Nevertheless, there are important differences
between the approach discussed here and communitarianism. For a discussion
of those differences; see id. at 1233-37.
457. In addition, a population-based perspective recognizes that there are
multiple, overlapping populations. See id. at 1234 n.78. Thus, public health
focuses not on the health of any single, all encompassing, reified "public," but
on the health of different populations. See id. In the case of the obesity
epidemic, children constitute a critical population whose vulnerabilities,
interests, and risks must be recognized as distinct from those of adults. See
James 0. Hill & Frederick L. Trowbridge, Childhood Obesity: Future Direc-
tions and Research Priorities, 101 PEDIATRICS 570, 573 (1998).
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ment as designed to protect groups or populations, rather than merely
individual interests. 418 As discussed in Part III, many theorists view
speech as a critical ingredient for the maintenance of social capital,
trust, and democratic deliberation. For example, Cass Sunstein and
Alexander Meiklejohn have each postulated that the First
Amendment aims to ensure this public role for speech.45 9 As a
result, the speech most worthy of First Amendment protection is
public debate, discourse, and communication. According to
Meiklejohn:
If men are engaged, as we so commonly are, in argument,
or inquiry, or advocacy, or incitement which is directed
toward our private interests, private privileges, private
possessions, we are, of course, entitled to "due process"
protection of those activities. But the First Amendment has
no concern over such protection.
... The First Amendment does not intend to guarantee men
freedom to say what some private interest pays them to say
for its own advantage. It intends only to make men free to
say what, as citizens, they think, what they believe, about
the general welfare.460
The recognition that we must understand the First Amendment
not only to serve a private purpose, but also in light of the public
impact of speech, is evident in much of the Supreme Court's
commercial speech doctrine. Indeed, a principal tenet of Central
Hudson, that government may regulate commercial speech to serve a
state interest, assumes that the First Amendment does not create an
individualist trump upon state power. Rather, the First Amendment
reconciles the need of populations to engage in discourse and receive
information with the interests of populations in having the state
protect them from harms that speech can cause. The interests of
populations, rather than simply individuals, are present and important
on both sides of the equation.
458. See id. at 1234.
459. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJoHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT 94, 104 (1948); Sunstein, supra note 57, at 259, 277.
460. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 459, at 94, 104.
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A population-based perspective, however, does not simply
recognize that the First Amendment takes account of population-
based interests. It also insists that we consider how speech affects
populations qua populations, both negatively and positively.461 In so
doing, it reminds us that actions and policies affect populations
differently than they affect individuals, and that "the public" is
comprised of multiple, overlapping populations.462 Thus, both
speech and laws that seek to limit it may have different effects upon
different populations. For example, speech and laws affect children
differently than adults.463 School children are yet another sub-
population, inhabiting a unique, restricted environment. If we want
to understand how speech affects populations, we must be sensitive
to the composition and environment of the population at issue.
Moreover, we cannot assume that speech speaks only to individuals;
we must understand how it alters environments.
In its commercial speech cases, the Supreme Court has at times
shown sensitivity to the dynamics of populations. For example, in
evaluating restrictions of outdoor tobacco advertising in Lorillard
Tobacco Co., the Court referenced population studies in its
application of the third prong of the Central Hudson test.464 The
Court cited population studies to note that:
children smoke fewer brands of cigarettes than adults, and
those choices directly track the most heavily advertised
brands. Another study revealed that 72% of 6 year olds and
52% of children ages 3 to 6 recognized "Joe Camel," the
cartoon anthropomorphic symbol of R.J. Reynolds' Camel
brand cigarettes. After the introduction of Joe Camel,
Camel cigarettes' share of the youth market rose from 4%
to 13%. The FDA also identified trends in tobacco
consumption among certain populations, such as young
women, that correlated to the introduction and marketing of
461. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 1234.
462. For a fuller discussion of this point, see id. at n.78.
463. The Supreme Court has recognized that the rights of children with
respect to speech may differ from those of adults, but it has also rejected the
idea of restricting speech that adults say or hear on the theory that it is
necessary to protect children. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997). A
population-based perspective may provide greater attention to the differing
interests of different populations.
464. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558-61 (2001).
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products geared toward that population.465
The Court relied upon such studies which emphasized the effect of
marketing on specific populations of children to provide ample
justification for the restriction by the state.466 The Court's discussion
focused entirely on different groups of children as populations rather
than on the effect of advertising on any particular child.467
Yet, as discussed previously, the Supreme Court has not
consistently adhered to a population-based approach. For example,
in Lorillard Tobacco Co., as it analyzed the state's outdoor
advertising restrictions under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson
test, the Court reverted to an individualistic perspective, focusing on
the impact of the ban on an autonomous adult.468 In effect, the Court
worried that, by restricting advertising, the state had limited the
ability of individual adults to obtain useful information. 469 Yet, in its
prior analysis, the Court had made clear that the point of the
advertising was not the transmission of information to individuals.
470
Advertising sought to create increased demand within a population,
in effect, to utilize population dynamics to alter demand. Why the
Court failed to recall the way that advertising alters demand
(especially among children) when it moved to its analysis of the
fourth prong is unclear.
Likewise, ir his plurality opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island,4 71 Justice Stevens invoked the specter of paternalism
in rejecting a state restriction on alcohol advertising. Justice
Stevens argued that, in contrast to adopting a paternalistic approach
that sought to protect individuals from advertisements that might
induce them to make bad decisions, the state could "assume that this
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the
best means to that end is to open the channels of communication
465. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
466. See id. at 561.
467. See id. at 558-61.
468. See id. at 561-66.
469. See id. at 564.
470. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (noting that the purpose of advertisements was a
"purely economic one").
471. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
472. Id. at 497-98.
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rather than to close them.
' A73
In treating paternalism as an inherent wrong, and by assuming
that advertising regulations necessarily seek to prevent individuals
from making poor choices for themselves, Justice Stevens ignored
the fact that advertising influences the social and informational
environment that populations inhabit.474 However, as we have seen,
speech can change the culture and world in which people reside.475
This altered environment can harm individuals regardless of their
own a priori preferences. As a result, by regulating the influences
upon the information environment, states are not necessarily being
paternalistic in the sense of protecting people from themselves.
Instead, states may be protecting people from an exogenous
environmental threat.476  By recalling that people are situated in
populations and environments and that speech acts upon individuals
through those media, a population-based legal analysis reminds us
that speech regulation is not necessarily a restraint upon individual
autonomy. At times, it is the expression or precondition for popula-
tion autonomy.477
473. Id. at 497 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770).
474. Justice Stevens also seemed to assume, as the Court has in other
commercial speech cases, that more speech is always better because it provides
individuals with information. See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 564; Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762. But in the information age, people
may be overwhelmed with speech, much of it designed not to provide
information, but to influence culture and policy. In these circumstances,
people need government to regulate the amount of information they receive for
"what seems to be government regulation of speech actually might promote
free speech, and should not be treated as an abridgement at all.... [W]hat
seems to be free speech in markets might, in some selected circumstances,
amount to an abridgement of free speech." Sunstein, supra note 57, at 267.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 210-24.
476. By altering the environment, commercial speech can affect not only
individual preferences, but also the external risks that individuals face. When
we understand that individual health is caused not simply by what individuals
choose, but also by the environment in which they operate, efforts to regulate
health-harming speech appear not as paternalistic, but as a way of protecting
against harms from which individuals cannot protect themselves.
477. Moreover, sensitivity to the environmental impact of speech would help
courts to see that, in many environments, such as public schools, commercial
speakers so heavily influence the information environment pertaining to food
and consumption that they may exclude other voices. Scholars have noted that
this effect is widespread and extends beyond mere advertising to children. For
example, advertising puts enormous pressures on news media and affects its
May 20061
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:363
A population-based approach to the First Amendment would
also permit the state to safeguard the informational environment not
only by permitting government-sponsored speech, which is
permissible by law but often of limited efficacy,47 8 but also by under-
taking other, limited regulations aimed at preventing the exclu-
sionary and health-impairing impact of some types of speech in
schools. As we !discuss in the final section, such regulations may
also compel fuller disclosures by commercial speakers, and seek to
reduce children's exposure to environment-altering speech that has
little or no informational content. 479 However, to determine when
speech sufficiently harms population health to justify regulation, as
well as whether regulations have the potential to protect the
populations, both the Central Hudson test and a population-based
approach to the First Amendment require reference to empirical data.
It is to this final component of a population-based approach that we
now turn.
C. Empiricism
A population-based legal analysis incorporates the
methodologies and approaches of public health, particularly its key
sub-discipline, epidemiology. 480 Simply, epidemiology is "the study
of health events in a population.' ' 81  It studies "the incidence,
prevalence, distribution, and etiology of disease" by utilizing a
variety of empirical, observational, and statistical methodologies.
482
By paying attention to epidemiological teachings, population-based
legal analysis accepts that empirical observation can help inform
legal analysis. Moreover, it understands that our knowledge about
the world is partial and changing. Legal decisions need to reflect not
simply the verities of legal deduction, but also the contingent and
content. LAWRENCE SOLEY, CENSORSHIP, INC.: THE CORPORATE THREAT TO
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 195 (2005). Corporate ownership of
media, coupled with corporate saturation of the channels of speech, has also
affected the content of the informational environment and speech. See id. at
19; Sunstein, supra note 57, at 280-85.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
479. See infra text accompanying notes 502-04.
480. TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 29, at 114.
481. Id.
482. Parmet & Robbins, supra note 433, at 705.
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testable information that comes from empirical observation.48 3
Using and understanding empirical data and epidemiology can
assist courts in determining whether and how speech affects different
populations as well as whether a contested regulation can survive the
third and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test. For example,
epidemiological studies can help courts determine the association or
relationship between an event and a result.48 4 This is the first step in
determining causation, which epidemiologists usually establish by
applying certain principles.4 8 5 Understanding epidemiological cau-
sation and the criteria for establishing it can be key in determining
whether there is a "substantial government interest 48 6 within the
meaning of the second prong of Central Hudson, as well as whether
a regulation "directly advances ' 48 7 that interest, as required under the
third prong.48 8 It may also help a court to understand whether the
regulation is more burdensome than is necessary to achieve the
489governmental interest.
As we have seen, the Supreme Court has frequently referred to
epidemiological studies and other similar studies in applying the
Central Hudson test.490 But the Court's treatment of such studies has
often been inconsistent and half-hearted. For example, after
referring to numerous health studies about the impact of tobacco
483. It is important to note that this is not law as social science. Rather, it is
a call to adopt some of the methodologies and approaches of public health to
supplement and clarify legal reasoning and the deduction of legal principles.
484. See Parmet & Robbins, supra note 433, at 705.
485. Most common are the Henle-Koch principles. These are the first set of
criteria established and tend to focus heavily on infectious diseases.
TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 29, at 254. The Evans Criteria,
developed later, provide a more modem approach which is applicable to public
health problems that are not necessarily associated with a pathogen. See id. at
254-55.
486. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
487. Id.
488. Thus, epidemiology can tell us if a particular type of speech is
improving or worsening the health of a population. It cannot give us any
information about the impact of the regulation on a particular individual within
that population.
489. See supra text accompanying notes 318-19.
490. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558-61 (2001)
(citing FDA findings of a correlation between cigarette ads and an increase in
smoking).
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advertising on clildren in Lorillard Tobacco Co., the Court seemed
to ignore the studies and their lessons when it asserted that the state's
regulation was overly broad.49' Moreover, in many of the
commercial speech cases, the Court has treated empirical studies, not
so much as sources of information to guide the analysis, but as
evidentiary burdens that the state must meet. Thus, in 44
Liquormart, the plurality appeared to demand a type of singular and
absolute proof about the relationship between alcohol advertising and
public health that misunderstands the nature of science.492 Because
the causes of disease in a population are complex and multifactorial,
and because our observations are always partial, epidemiological
evidence is seldom either complete or totally conclusive.493 Instead
of providing "slam dunk" proof of causation, most studies add to our
understanding and provide further proof or refutation of a causal
relationship between a particular factor and the incidence of disease
in a population.494 Only after multiple studies or in very clear cases,
such as that which exists between cigarette smoking and lung cancer,
can final answers be given early in the study of an epidemic.
The accumulative and partial nature of epidemiological evidence
presents a challenge for courts.495 If they do not insist upon
empirical evidence, they risk judicial decisions that have little
bearing upon the actual risks that populations face in the real world.
If they insist too strongly, they risk demanding a type of compre-
hensive and irrefutable proof that is not possible, especially when
epidemics are new and our knowledge of them still growing. To
demand such proof leads exactly where it led in Lochner v. New
York 496-- it disables the government from responding to new health
threats.497
491. See supra text accompanying note 341.
492. See supra text accompanying notes 472-73.
493. See TULCHINSKY & VARAVIKOVA, supra note 29, at 119.
494. See id.
495. This has led some commentators to argue that commercial speech
should be given very wide protection. See Redish, supra note 432, at 1437.
We do not believe that the contingent and developing nature of
epidemiological knowledge demands that the government cease attempting to
protect public health. Were that the case, the great sanitary achievements of
the nineteenth century would not have occurred.
496. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
497. See id. at 64.
A POPULATION-BASED APPROACH
A population-based approach to the First Amendment would
seek to avoid both extremes. Instead, it would look closely at, and
take seriously, the empirical and epidemiological evidence that
exists. It would also require the state to provide a well-founded,
empirically-based rationale for its regulation. But it would not
require the state to conclusively establish a causal relationship
between a particular type of speech and a public harm, nor between a
particular regulation and the successful protection of public health.
Instead, a population-based approach would assure that review was
careful, but not necessarily fatal.
VII. CONCLUSION
Constitutional law faces many great challenges. As the
Federalist Papers taught us, one is to ensure that government is both
robust enough to protect populations while preventing it from
overreaching and harming populations and their individuals.498 We
must face that challenge when speech threatens public health, as
increasingly seems to be the case with respect to the epidemic of
obesity and overweight among children.
As we have suggested, there are no simple answers. An
absolutist view of the First Amendment that privileges speech,
including commercial speech, above all other human activities, risks
an informational environment that alters culture in health-impairing
ways, saps public trust, and undermines the health of populations. It
also replicates an error of Lochner, that is, it would excessively
privilege one type of right without understanding that all rights must
co-exist within civil society.
On the other hand, we must value free speech, not only because
the Bill of Rights and our constitutional jurisprudence say so, but
also because, as we have discussed, speech is an important tool for
creating community and protecting public health. Too light an
application of the First Amendment thus threatens health as much as
it may help it.
498. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 42, 45 (James Madison) (Garry Wills
ed., 1982). As we write this, the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina and the failure
of the government's response unfolds, and we are reminded, yet again, of why
governments are needed and why we cannot assume that atomistic individuals
can help themselves.
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To navigate between the Scylla of First Amendment absolutism
and the Charybdis of excessive deference to the state, we have
proposed the application of a population-based perspective. This
approach values the state's role in protecting public health and takes
account of the role of populations and the teachings of epidemiology.
It is consistent with the First Amendment and the Central Hudson
test. In addition, it would return commercial speech doctrine to the
mainstream of constitutional law, placing First Amendment rights
among others that are protected, indeed cherished, but applied with
sensitivity to the imperatives of population health.
What would this approach mean with respect to the childhood
obesity epidemic? We have suggested above that it would first and
foremost take account of the ways that speech alters the environment
to affect the health of populations. By recognizing that speech is not
simply the conveyance of factual information to rational, isolated
individuals, it would appreciate the social, environmental, and
population dimensions of commercial speech. This would enable
both regulators and courts to take account of the ways in which
commercial speech has changed children's environment, leading to
more obesity.
More specifically, a population-based approach would follow
both Zauderer v. 'Office of Disciplinary Counsel,4 99 and Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott and look favorably upon regulations that
compel truthful warnings and labeling, insuring that some factual
information accompanies those advertisements and promotions that
are designed simply to change the cultural association of food
products or alter social relationships, such as those between parents
and children. However, based upon what the empirical evidence tells
us today, a population-based approach would not assume that
tolerance of compelled speech will necessarily suffice as the sole
regulatory tool. As we have shown, public health communications
that rely simply on providing individuals with the facts have seldom
had substantial positive effects. 50 They are not usually sufficient to
change the powerful culture-altering impact of commercial speech.
50 2
499. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
500. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
501. See supra text accompanying notes 74-87.
502. It is important here to recall that public health programs are less likely
to be effective when they seek to change culturally-driven behavior. See supra
A POPULATION-BASED APPROACH
The recognition of the multiple environmental ways that speech
affects population health suggests that some limited regulation of
commercial speech may be appropriate and constitutional in order to
lower the incidence (or stop the increasing incidence) of childhood
obesity. In other words, we should take Central Hudson at its word
and treat it, not as an elaborate ruse for the erection of uncrossable
barriers to the regulation of commercial speech, but as a template for
carefully reviewing the rationale and appropriateness of commercial
speech regulations. Such an approach would take into account the
population-effect of speech and would rely heavily, but with
sophistication, upon epidemiological evidence. This approach would
permit some regulation of food advertising, particularly the
advertisements aimed at schoolchildren.
Without specific regulations and evidence before us, and
mindful of the importance of empirical evidence and context, we are
reluctant to suggest what types of advertising regulations would pass
muster. However, regulations that limit the amount of non-
informational food advertising aimed at children, or promotions that
rely upon branding in schools, come readily to mind. Such
regulations would not censor as much as they would reduce the
volume of, and exposure of children to, commercial speech,
50 3
seeking to ensure that such speech relies less on the alteration of
image and culture and more on the provision of information which,
after all, is the supposed rationale for protecting commercial speech
in the first place.
°4
text accompanying notes 99-124. Thus, "plain vanilla" warnings about the
dangers of certain foods or of overeating are in themselves unlikely to be
effective in the face of the food industry's powerful marketing campaigns
aimed at children.
503. First Amendment jurisprudence has long treated the time, place, and
manner regulations differently from content-based regulations. See, e.g., Clark
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293-95 (1984). To some
extent we are suggesting that certain regulations that seek to limit the exposure
of children to food marketing may be viewed as akin to such regulations.
However, as a doctrinal manner, because the regulations would differentiate
speech initially by their content, such regulations should rightly be analyzed
under Central Hudson and not as time, place, or manner regulations.
504. See supra text accompanying notes 281-89.
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Of course, courts would need to review all regulations of
commercial speech on their own merits and with sensitivity, not just
to public health, but also to the values of free speech. By applying a
population-based approach, courts can begin that task and ensure that
our First Amendment does not undermine the health of our children.
